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Abstract: 
In recent years, the U.N. Security Council has repeatedly come under criticism for its inaction 
in the face of serious violations of international law. As a means to prevent further deadlocks, 
this article advocates the introduction of a duty to explain votes cast in the Council. In certain 
situations, such a duty to give reasons already exists today, although it is not implemented. 
We propose to extend this duty to all votes in the Security Council and to codify it in its 
Provisional Rules of Procedure. A comprehensive duty to give reasons has three major 
virtues: it increases the quality of Council decisions, it enhances legal certainty, and it 
improves the accountability of the Council and of its members. As opposed to structural 
reforms, our proposal does not necessitate amending the U.N. Charter and thus does not 
depend on the consent of the Council’s permanent members. 
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Introduction 
On 18 December 2014 the U.N. General Assembly called on the Security Council to consider 
referring the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).
1
 The resolution, adopted by a vote of 116 to 20 with 53 abstentions, 
followed a U.N. Commission of Inquiry report that detailed systematic, widespread and gross 
violations of human rights in North Korea and concluded that, in many instances, these 
violations amounted to crimes against humanity.
2
 It is, however, unlikely that a resolution 
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referring the situation in North Korea to the ICC would even be proposed in the Security 
Council since China has made it clear that it will veto any such proposal.
3
 
This and similar instances of inaction by the Security Council in the face of serious 
violations of international law, including with regard to the situations in Syria and 
Israel/Palestine, have reignited criticism of the Council. However, it would be naïve to expect 
that deadlocks of the Council could be addressed through reform of membership of the 
Council or the veto power. Any such reform would require an amendment of the U.N. 
Charter, which can be blocked by the non-ratification of one of the Council’s five permanent 
members (P5).
4
  
In this article, we explain how the risk of such deadlocks of the Security Council could 
be minimized through a change of its procedure, rather than its structure. We argue that 
enhancing the transparency of the Council’s working methods would help it better perform its 
tasks. More specifically, we suggest the introduction of a duty to give reasons for votes cast in 
the Security Council. As opposed to structural reforms, our proposal does not depend on the 
consent of the P5: it can be implemented through an amendment of the Council’s Provisional 
Rules of Procedure (PRoP), which only requires the affirmative vote of nine members.
5
 
In Section 1, we analyse the working methods of the Security Council and its 
subsidiary bodies and highlight the lack of transparency, in particular the absence of a duty to 
give reasons for decisions or votes. Section 2 discusses the legal limits that are applicable to 
acts (or omissions) of the Security Council as a collective body as well as the voting 
behaviour of its members. We argue that the Council does not operate in a legal vacuum and 
that compliance with the legal limits imposed on it and its members can be reviewed in 
various ways. However, a meaningful legal review of the Council’s acts and its members’ 
votes is only possible if the reviewing body knows the motives behind them. In Section 3, we 
show that, in certain situations, there is already today, de lege lata, an obligation incumbent 
on the Security Council to give reasons for its decisions and, respectively, on its members to 
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explain their votes. In Section 4, we sketch out a proposal to introduce, de lege ferenda, a 
comprehensive duty to explain in a public meeting every vote cast in the Security Council. 
Such a duty to give reasons, we argue, has three major virtues: it increases the quality of 
Council decisions, it enhances legal certainty, and it improves the accountability of the 
Council as a whole and of its members. 
 
1 Lack of Transparency in Security Council Deliberations 
Today, the Security Council conducts the bulk of its business behind closed doors. As a 
general rule, reasons are given neither for the votes cast in the Council by its members nor for 
the Council’s decisions themselves (1.1). The working methods of the subsidiary bodies 
established by the Security Council are even more obscure. Often they do not even 
communicate their decisions, let alone the reasons for them (1.2).  
 
1.1 Working Methods of the Security Council  
In the first decades of its existence, the Security Council met only rarely and did not decide 
much. On average it adopted fourteen resolutions a year,
6
 most of which did not attract much 
attention.
7
 With the end of the Cold War, this changed dramatically. Not only does the 
Council now meet on an almost daily basis and pass significantly more resolutions—on 
average 62 a year.
8
 It has also expanded its scope of activity in qualitative terms: Beyond the 
executive functions for which it was originally designed, the Security Council today regularly 
acts as an administrative body, directly affecting important interests of individuals and entities 
other than states, and even performs certain legislative tasks.
9
 As a consequence, its 
resolutions have become more complex and significant. 
                                                 
6
  Michael C. Wood, ‘Security Council Working Methods and Procedure: Recent Developments’ (1996) 45 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly p. 151, DOI:10.1017/S0020589300058693. 
7
  Michael C. Wood, ‘The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions’ (1998) 2 Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law p. 74. 
8
  See infra Figure 1. 
9
  E.g.: Ian Johnstone, ‘Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council: Bringing Down the 
Deliberative Deficit’ (2008) 102 American Journal of International Law p. 275, DOI:10.2307/30034539; 
Paul C. Szasz, ‘The Security Council Starts Legislating’ (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law p. 
4 
The working methods of the Security Council have in no way kept pace with these 
developments. They are still based on the PRoP, which were discussed at the Council’s very 
first meeting of 17 January 1946 and adopted on 9 April 1946.
10
 As their title indicates, these 
were originally merely meant to serve as an interim solution but became permanent as the 
Council members (especially the P5) preferred to retain flexibility rather than to settle on a 
fixed, detailed set of procedures.
11
 Compared with the rules of procedure of other 
international organs, they are rudimentary.
12
 The PRoP contain only few, very basic rules on 
decision-making. In particular, they fail to provide for a standard procedure or an institutional 
mechanism to ensure that resolutions are well drafted.
13
 
How does a resolution of the Security Council come about? Normally, a member of 
the Security Council (the so-called ‘sponsor’ of the resolution)—most often one of the P5—
prepares a first draft, which is then discussed with the delegations of some friendly states 
(which may or may not be Council members). This may be followed by informal 
consultations with the other members of the Council.
14
 In most cases, however, only some 
select Council members—typically the other permanent members—are consulted.15 As the 
representative of South Africa has complained, “resolutions and decisions of the Council are 
often drafted in small groups and presented as faits accomplis to elected members.”16 Finally, 
the text of the draft resolution is circulated as an official document of the Security Council.  
The President of the Security Council then calls a formal meeting of the Security 
Council, which, as a rule, is public.
17
 In the meeting, the members vote on the draft resolution 
by show of hands. In addition to statements made in the general debate preceding the vote, 
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members may also explain their vote orally either before or after the vote.
18
 However, they are 
not obliged to do so. A resolution is adopted if nine or more of the fifteen members vote for it, 
and if it is not vetoed by any of the P5.
19
 The text of the resolution itself does not contain any 
reasons. While it is sometimes possible to glean some reasons from the preamble of a 
resolution, most preambles only include clauses that members could not find an agreement on 
and that were therefore removed from the operative part of the resolution.
20
 
This means that the reasons why a resolution has (or has not) been adopted can only be 
gathered from the statements and explanations given in the formal meeting. Of these 
meetings, verbatim records are kept, which are published
21
 and can be accessed on the 
website of the Security Council. However, the members of the Security Council only very 
rarely explain their votes. To the extent that explanations are given, they are mainly used to 
make political statements rather than to clarify meaning.
22
 As a consequence, only those 
members that were themselves involved in the drafting of a given Security Council resolution 
will be able to understand the full significance of the action taken. Since in most cases the 
drafting process is in the hands of only some of the members—typically the P5—, all the 
other states, the media as well as the wider public will not be aware of the motives behind a 
given resolution. 
This problem has arguably intensified over the last few years. The explosion of the 
workload of the Security Council in the early 1990s led to greater attention being paid to its 
working methods, which increasingly came to be seen as outdated. Accordingly, calls were 
raised for a reform of the Council’s working methods, in particular for improvements with 
regard to transparency, effectiveness, accountability, and participation.
23
 A number of 
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important reforms were in fact implemented over the following 20 years. The Note by the 
President of the Security Council on the Council’s working methods of 2010 lists 73 practices 
and measures designed “to enhance the efficiency and transparency of the Council’s work, as 
well as interaction and dialogue with non-Council members”, which had been agreed in 
preceding years.
24
 These include, among others, regular briefings of UN member states, 
improved documentation of the Council’s work, publication of the programme of work, 
increased recourse to open meetings, introduction of new meeting formats, improvements 
with regard to the annual report to the General Assembly, better briefing of newly elected 
Council members, expanded consultation and cooperation with international and regional 
organizations (such as in ‘Informal Interactive Dialogues’)25, increased discussion and 
consultation with troop- and police-contributing countries and other interested states, and, 
finally, holding of informal ‘Arria-formula’ meetings with non-state actors.26 
Yet these efforts to make the Council’s formal procedures more transparent also had a 
counterproductive effect in that, combined with the rising workload, they led to a shift of 
decision-making to more informal settings, which Council members see as more efficient and 
conducive to compromise.
27
 During the 1990s ‘informal consultations’—be it of all the 
members of the Security Council (‘informal consultations of the whole’) or of some of them 
(notably the P5)
28—became the preferred forum for carrying out the bulk of the Council’s 
work.
29
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Figure 1. Number of formal and informal meetings of the Security Council between 1988 
and 2014.
30
 
 
As opposed to the Council’s formal meetings, informal consultations are not public, no 
official records are kept and non-members of the Council cannot attend.
31
 They are not 
provided for in the Charter or the PRoP. As the then-French permanent representative put it, 
“informal meetings are not even real Council meetings at all; they have no official existence, 
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and are assigned no number.”32 Nevertheless, almost all the important decisions of the 
Security Council are now agreed in advance in these informal, secret consultations.
33
 Informal 
consultations have replaced the formal Security Council meetings as the central forum for 
political interaction on questions relating to international peace and security. 
At the same time, the formal public Security Council meetings have been reduced to 
pro forma affairs: they merely serve to put on record what has already been informally agreed. 
As opposed to informal consultations, which may run into several sessions lasting many 
hours, the formal meetings often do not last longer than five to ten minutes.
34
 In opening an 
official meeting, the President of the Council will typically refer to the text of a draft 
resolution that has been submitted,
35
 often noting that “the Council is meeting in accordance 
with the understanding reached in its prior consultations”.36 The Council will then proceed to 
the vote. Actual discussions or debates have become very rare. As Erika de Wet has 
concluded, “[t]he net result is that the Security Council meets in public only to adopt 
resolutions already agreed upon in informal meetings, without giving any insight into the 
motives underpinning its decisions.”37 This even holds true for resolutions of far-reaching 
importance such as Security Council Resolution 1373, passed after the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001. Despite the complexity of the issues addressed in, and raised by, this 
resolution and despite its legislative nature, the respective meeting only lasted five minutes.
38
 
Not a single statement was made on the draft resolution, and no Council member explained its 
vote.
39
  
As ‘informal consultations of the whole’ have become institutionalized and—to some 
extent—themselves formalized,40 there has been a trend to move discussions and decision-
making to smaller, even more informal settings. These may be meetings of groups of states 
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(such as the P5, ‘Groups of Friends’ or ‘Contact Groups’)41 or even lower level meetings of 
experts.
42
 This trend of delegating substantive negotiations to more exclusive fora is 
problematic as it “produces even deeper layers of informality and confidentiality.”43 
Confidentiality characterizes not only the working methods of the Security Council itself but 
also those of its subsidiary bodies. 
 
1.2 Working Methods of Subsidiary Bodies 
The Security Council has established, as it is authorized to by Article 29 of the U.N. Charter, 
several subsidiary bodies whose composition mirrors its own. In many respects, the 
procedures of these subsidiary bodies are even more obscure than those of the Council itself. 
As is the case with the Council, the bulk of their work is carried out in informal consultations, 
which are held in private and without a record being taken.  
The most important subsidiary bodies are the committees created by the Council to 
administer and monitor sanctions.
44
 As a general rule, the various sanctions committees 
conduct their business behind closed doors and do not publish records of their meetings.
45
 
They only rarely give reasons for their decisions.
46
 
For example, the meetings of the Iraq Sanctions Committee, established in 1990 by 
Security Council Resolution 661, were secret and minutes were only kept in the form of 
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summary, not verbatim, records.
47
 While in the judgment of the Committee’s former deputy 
secretary this created a more efficient, “more businesslike atmosphere”, he also took the view 
that the Committee had taken the matter of secrecy too far, as its decisions were not 
communicated to all states potentially affected by them.
48
 In fact, the Committee was not even 
required to give account of its activities to the organ that had created it, the Security 
Council.
49
 
Similarly, the Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee, created in 1991, met behind closed 
doors and did not even record the vote of its members.
50
 Rather than publishing reasoned 
decisions, it only issued “brief conclusory communications, with the barest references to 
context”, often making it impossible to ascertain the facts the Committee considered 
material.
51
 This led commentators to conclude that “the Committee has operated in obscurity, 
with its rulings and record familiar only to a handful of government officials, despite the fact 
that the interpretations of the Committee have a direct impact on the conduct of thousands of 
businesses around the world on a daily basis.”52 
Also committees that administer so-called targeted sanctions, that is, sanctions that are 
directed against individuals and specific groups rather than states, exhibit a lack of 
transparency. While it may be appropriate for the deliberations on individual cases of such 
committees to be confidential,
53
 even general information about the basis for including 
individuals and groups on the respective sanctions lists (or removing them from these lists) is 
generally not publicly available.
54
 Between 1999 and 2005, the former Al-Qaida and Taliban 
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Sanctions Committee, established according to Security Council Resolution 1267 of 1999
55
 
and split into two separate committees in 2011,
56
 held five times as many informal, 
unrecorded consultations as formal meetings.
57
 Moreover, none of the sanctions committees 
directly informs the individuals and entities concerned of their listing (let alone of the reasons 
for the listing), instead relying on member states to notify the targets of sanctions.
58
 Yet even 
notification of member states by the committees is often inadequate.
59
 As a consequence, 
there have been instances when designated individuals and entities have reportedly learned 
about their listing from non-official sources.
60
 
In response to criticism regarding the secretive nature of the working methods of its 
sanctions committees, the Security Council has repeatedly encouraged them to enhance the 
transparency of their decision-making. For example, the Security Council has suggested that 
committees publish their work on the Internet, make summary records of their formal 
meetings publicly available, and prepare annual reports on their activities.
61
 The 1267 
Committee, in 2004, called upon states that propose individuals or groups for inclusion on its 
sanctions list to provide, to the greatest extent possible, information about their connection 
with Al-Qaida or the Taliban.
62
 In 2005, it introduced a requirement that such states “shall 
provide to the Committee a statement of case describing the basis of the proposal”.63 Yet the 
Committee still used to give no reasons for its decisions to list or (not) delist individuals or 
groups. This only changed with Security Council Resolution 1904 of 2009, which directed the 
Committee to make accessible on its website ‘narrative summaries of reasons for listing’ the 
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respective individuals and entities on its sanctions list.
64
 Nevertheless, the Committee is still 
not obliged to publish fully reasoned decisions, which would specify the supporting evidence. 
 
2 Legal Limits on the Security Council  
There is a whole range of reasons why the Security Council’s obscure working methods, and 
the lack of a duty to explain the voting behaviour in particular, may be regarded, in terms of 
policy, as inappropriate or unwise. From a legal point of view, however, this lack of 
transparency is only problematic if the Security Council and/or its individual members are 
subject to legal limits at all and if there are ways of reviewing compliance with these legal 
limits. This Section shows that such legal limits and means of review indeed exist. The 
Security Council’s actions must comply with a range of legal obligations (2.1). Different 
bodies and entities can review whether they do or not (2.2). Similarly, when voting in the 
Council, its members are bound to respect a number of legal obligations (2.3), and there are 
various ways in which their voting behaviour can be reviewed (2.4). 
 
2.1 Legal Limits on Security Council (In)action 
Are there any legal limits to what the most powerful, quintessentially political organ of the 
United Nations can do? Article 25 of the U.N. Charter states that “[t]he Members of the 
United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in 
accordance with the present Charter.” This provision could be understood to mean that only 
those decisions that are in accordance with the Charter are binding, while other decisions need 
not be carried out. According to this—what Anne Peters calls “radical”65—interpretation of 
Article 25, it seems clear that there are legal limits on Security Council action. However, there 
are other plausible interpretations of Article 25, and the travaux préparatoires are not 
                                                 
64
  U.N. Security Council, Resolution 1904, 17 December 2009 (U.N. Doc. S/RES/1904), para. 14. See also 
U.N. Security Council, Resolution 2083, 17 December 2012 (U.N. Doc. S/RES/2083), para. 14 (welcoming 
the efforts to make accessible a narrative summary of reasons for listings). 
65
  Anne Peters, ‘Article 25’ in Bruno Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 
(3
rd
 ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) p. 787, para. 56 (hereinafter Peters, Article 25 U.N. 
Charter). 
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conclusive.
66
 Therefore, the question as to the limitations to the Council’s powers must be 
answered having regard, not only to Article 25, but the whole Charter and on the basis of 
principled considerations.
67
 
Hans Kelsen argued in 1951 that, as the preserver of international peace and security, 
“the Security Council is not bound strictly to comply with existing law.”68 A minority of 
authors still take the position that the Council’s powers are unlimited.69 Today’s majority 
view, however, is that, given that the Security Council is an organ established by a treaty, it 
must act within certain legal limits.
70
 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated already in 
1947 that “[t]he political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of treaty 
provisions established by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria 
for its judgment.”71 It was, however, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), in the famous Tadić case, which best summarized the now prevalent 
position: 
“The Security Council is an organ of an international organization, established by a treaty which 
serves as a constitutional framework for that organization. The Security Council is thus subjected to 
certain constitutional limitations, however broad its powers under the constitution may be … [N]either 
                                                 
66
  Bernd Martenczuk, Rechtsbindung und Rechtskontrolle des Weltsicherheitsrats: Die Überprüfung 
nichtmilitärischer Zwangsmassnahmen durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof (Duncker und Humblot, 
Berlin, 1996) pp. 129–133. 
67
  Martenczuk, supra note 66, p. 133; Peters, Article 25 U.N. Charter, supra note 65, para. 60. 
68
  Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (Lawbook 
Exchange, New Jersey, 1951) p. 275.  
69
  E.g.: Gabriel H. Oosthuizen, ‘Playing the Devil’s Advocate: The United Nations Security Council is 
Unbound by Law’ (1999) 12 Leiden Journal of International Law p. 521, DOI: 
10.1017/S0922156599000278; Michael Reisman, ‘The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations’ (1993) 87 
American Journal of International Law pp. 91–94, DOI: 10.1163/ej.9780792323181.13-496.69. 
70
  E.g.: Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Disobeying the Security Council: Countermeasures against Wrongful 
Sanctions (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) pp. 54–56; Dapo Akande, ‘The International Court of 
Justice and the Security Council: Is There Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of 
the United Nations?’ (1997) 46 International and Comparative Law Quarterly p. 315, DOI: 
10.1017/S0020589300060450; Thomas M. Franck, ‘The “Powers of Appreciation”: Who Is the Ultimate 
Guardian of UN Legality?’ (1992) 86 American Journal of International Law pp. 522–523, DOI: 
10.2307/2203965. 
71
  Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), 28 May 
1948, International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 57, p. 64. 
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the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of the Security Council as legibus solutus (unbound by 
law).”72 
Thus, it seems clear that the Security Council is subject to the law. From this it follows 
that, in principle, not only its actions but also its omissions may be illegal. In exceptional 
cases, the Council may be under a legal obligation to take a decision, so that failure to act may 
amount to a violation of international law.
73
  
It is also worth stressing that Article 103 of the U.N. Charter is no obstacle to there 
being legal limits to Security Council action. As is clear from the wording of this provision, it 
only applies to “the obligations of the Members of the United Nations”, not the Security 
Council itself. Moreover, it only concerns the relationship between obligations under the 
Charter and “obligations under any other international agreement”, but not obligations under 
customary international law.
74
 
What is still contentious, however, is what exactly the legal limits to the powers of the 
Security Council are. There is a nearly unanimous view in legal scholarship that, first of all, 
the Security Council may not violate norms of jus cogens as these are overriding norms of the 
international legal order binding all subjects of international law. When adopting the U.N. 
Charter, member states could not derogate from these peremptory norms.
75
 This view finds 
                                                 
72
  Prosecutor v. Tadić, 2 October 1995, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals 
Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 
para. 28.  
73
  Anne Peters, ‘Article 24’ in Bruno Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 
(3
rd
 ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) p. 761, paras. 36–40 (hereinafter Peters, Article 24 U.N. 
Charter). 
74
  Peters, Article 25 U.N. Charter, supra note 65, paras. 209–211. 
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  E.g.: David Schweigman, The Authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: Legal 
Limits and the Role of the International Court of Justice 197-201 (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 
2001); Tzanakopoulos, supra note 70, pp. 70–72; Erika de Wet and André Nollkaemper, ‘Review of Security 
Council Decisions by National Courts’ (2002) 45 German Yearbook of International Law pp. 181–184. But 
see Evelyne Lagrange, ‘Le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies peut-il violer le droit international?’ (2004) 
2 Revue belge de droit international pp. 582–585; Bernd Martenczuk, ‘The Security Council, the 
International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?’ (1999) 10 European Journal of 
International Law pp. 545–546, DOI: 10.1093/ejil/10.3.517. 
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support in the case law of the ICJ,
76
 the former Court of First Instance of the European 
Communities (CFI)
77
 and national courts.
78
 
Second, it seems clear that the Security Council is bound by the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations.
79
 This legal limit to the Council’s powers is expressly 
contained in Article 24(2) of the Charter, which provides that “the Security Council shall act 
in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” As Judge 
Weeramantry of the ICJ has remarked, this duty “is imperative and the limits are categorically 
stated.”80 It seems beyond contention that a decision of the Council that does not at least 
aspire to reach one of the purposes of the United Nations listed in Article 1 would be ultra 
vires and therefore illegal.
81
 However, these purposes are so broadly defined that almost any 
decision could be said to further it.  
                                                 
76
  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. v. Serbia and Montenegro), 13 September 1993, International Court of Justice, Provisional 
Measures, Order, separate opinion by Lauterpacht, J., I.C.J. Rep. 325, para. 100: “The concept of jus cogens 
operates as a concept superior to both customary international law and treaty. The relief which Article 103 of 
the Charter may give the Security Council in case of conflict between one of its decisions and an operative 
treaty obligation cannot—as a matter of simple hierarchy of norms—extend to a conflict between a Security 
Council resolution and jus cogens. Indeed, one only has to state the opposite proposition thus—that a 
Security Council resolution may even require participation in genocide—for its unacceptability to be 
apparent.” 
77
  Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, 21 September 2005, 
Court of First Instance of the European Communities, Case T-306/01, E.C.R. II-03533, paras. 277–281; 
Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission, 21 September 2005, Court of First Instance of the 
European Communities, Case T-315/01, E.C.R. II-03649, paras. 226–230. 
78
  E.g.: Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 14 November 2007, 125 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen 
Bundesgerichts (BGE) 133 II 450, 460-463. 
79
  E.g.: de Wet, supra note 37, pp. 191–215; Schweigman, supra note 75, pp. 167–182; Akande, supra note 70, 
pp. 316–317; Lagrange, supra note 75, pp. 585–587. 
80
  Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K.), 14 April 1992, International Court of Justice, 
Provisional Measures, Order, dissenting opinion by Weeramantry, J., I.C.J. Rep. 3, p. 171. See also 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. v. Serbia and Montenegro), 13 September 1993, International Court of Justice, Provisional 
Measures, Order, separate opinion by Lauterpacht, J., I.C.J. Rep. 325, para. 101 (arguing that the Security 
Council must act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations in discharging its 
duties to maintain international peace and security). 
81
  Peters, Article 25 U.N. Charter, supra note 65, para. 77. 
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Third, many authors argue that, since international organizations are bound by their 
internal law, notably by their constituent instrument, not only the purposes and principles but 
the entire U.N. Charter constitutes a legal limit on Security Council action.
82
 According to 
this view, limits imposed on the Security Council by the Charter include the rules on 
competences,
83
 the obligation to determine the existence of a “threat to the peace” according 
to Article 39,
84
 as well as the obligation to take proportionate action in response to such a 
threat.
85
 
Fourth, there is strong support for the position that the Security Council is bound to 
comply with human rights, at the very least those guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR).
86
 Doctrinally, there are different ways in which such a duty can be 
explained. One may, for example, point to the fact that among the purposes of the United 
Nations listed in Article 1 of the Charter, which according to Article 24(2) are binding on the 
Security Council, is that of “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms”87.88 Or one may point out that the United Nations, by establishing a 
system of human rights protection, has created a legal expectation that its organs, including 
the Security Council, will themselves respect these rights.
89
 Or one may argue that the 
Council, as an organ of an organization endowed with international legal personality, must at 
                                                 
82
  Martenczuk, supra note 66, pp. 120–163; Tzanakopoulos, supra note 70, pp. 57–59; Peters, Article 25 U.N. 
Charter, supra note 65, paras. 87–89. 
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  Peters, Article 25 U.N. Charter, supra note 65, para. 90. 
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  De Wet, supra note 37, pp. 133–177; Tzanakopoulos, supra note 70, pp. 60–64; Talmon, supra note 9, pp. 
184–185. 
85
  Tzanakopoulos, supra note 70, pp. 64–67; Lagrange, supra note 75, pp. 587–591. 
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  Peters, Article 25 U.N. Charter, supra note 65, paras. 120–121. 
87
  U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3. See also U.N. Charter art. 55, para. c (stipulating that in order to create 
conditions of stability and well-being, the U.N. shall promote universal respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms). 
88
  E.g.: Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. v. Serbia and Montenegro), 13 September 1993, International Court of Justice, Provisional 
Measures, Order, separate opinion by Lauterpacht, J., I.C.J. Rep. 325, para. 101; Al-Dulimi and Montana 
Management Inc. v. Switzerland, 21 June 2016, European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), no. 
5809/08, para. 139. 
89
  E.g.: de Wet and Nollkaemper, supra note 75, pp. 173–175. 
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least comply with those human rights obligations that have become part of customary 
international law.
90
 
A more contentious proposition is that, fifth, the Security Council is bound to comply, 
not only with jus cogens and human rights norms, but with the whole body of general 
international law, that is, all customary law and general principles of law.
91
 Some authors 
putting forth this proposition make reference to Article 1(1) of the Charter, which provides, as 
one of the purposes of the United Nations, that international disputes or situations that might 
lead to a breach of the peace are to be adjusted or settled “in conformity with the principles of 
justice and international law”.92 Other authors, in contrast, point out that “justice and 
international law” are only mentioned in the context of the peaceful settlement of disputes but 
not in that of collective measures under Chapter VII, concluding that the Council must not 
comply with general international law when it is acting to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.
93
 
 
2.2 Legal Review of Security Council (In)action 
The question of legal limits to Security Council (in)action is to be distinguished from the 
question of whether it is possible to review whether the Council stays within these limits. That 
the Council is bound by the law does not mean that there are mechanisms for reviewing its 
acts. On the other hand, the absence of specific control mechanisms in international law does 
not preclude the possibility of it being bound. Nevertheless, the two questions are closely 
linked. For what is the point of legal limits if there is no one who could check whether they 
are complied with?
94
 And what, on the other hand, is the point of reviewing an act if there are 
no legal standards by which to judge it? 
 
                                                 
90
  Akande, supra note 70, pp. 323–324. 
91
  E.g.: Tzanakopoulos, supra note 70, pp. 72–79; Mehrdad Payandeh, ‘Rechtskontrolle des UN-
Sicherheitsrates durch staatliche und überstaatliche Gerichte’ (2006) 66 Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht pp. 46–47. 
92
  Akande, supra note 70, pp. 317–321. 
93
  Martenczuk, supra note 75, pp. 544–546; Lagrange, supra note 75, pp. 578–582. This argument goes back to 
Hans Kelsen: Kelsen, supra note 68, pp. 294–295. 
94
  See Reisman, supra note 69, p. 92. 
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2.2.1 Review by Courts 
There is not one central, superior judicial institution that would be charged with supervising 
the Security Council and that could quash its decisions. Nevertheless, there are manifold ways 
in which the legality of Security Council action may be (and indeed is) reviewed by various 
courts and quasi-judicial bodies. 
First, the ICJ may directly review the legality of a Security Council decision in an 
advisory proceeding. Article 96(1) of the U.N. Charter authorizes the General Assembly and 
the Security Council to request the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on any legal question. 
Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies may request advisory opinions 
on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.
95
 The legality of action (to be) 
taken by the Security Council is undoubtedly a “legal question” in the sense of Article 96.96 In 
addition, the legality of a Council decision can arise incidentally in advisory proceedings 
when the Court has to determine the legal consequences of Council action. This has in fact 
happened in the Certain Expenses opinion
97
 and the Namibia opinion.
98
 
Second, although the ICJ cannot directly review Security Council acts in contentious 
proceedings because only states can be parties to such proceedings,
99
 an incidental review is 
possible. A case may arise between two or more states where a resolution of the Security 
Council is part of the law that the ICJ is called upon to apply. In such a situation, the Court 
may have to determine whether that resolution is valid in the first place.
100
 This is a question 
the Court is allowed to address, since it can consider any legal question that may be at issue 
between the parties of a dispute.
101
 One may imagine a number of different scenarios where 
the Court would have to examine whether a given act of the Security Council is valid so as to 
be able to decide the case before it. If, for example, a boundary dispute between Iraq and 
                                                 
95
  U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 2. 
96
  Akande, supra note 70, pp. 327–328. 
97
  Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), 20 July 1962, International 
Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 151, pp. 163–168. See de Wet, supra note 37, pp. 30–34. 
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  Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 21 June 1971, International Court of Justice, 
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 16, para. 89. See de Wet, supra note 37, pp. 34–41. 
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  Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34 para. 1, June 26, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI. 
100
  Akande, supra note 70, pp. 331–333. 
101
  United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 24 May 1980, International Court of 
Justice, Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 3, para. 40. 
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Kuwait came before the ICJ, it would be required to examine whether the Security Council 
had in fact the power to establish the Boundary Commission that demarcated the boundary as 
it now exists.
102
 In the Lockerbie case, the ICJ did at least not exclude the possibility that it 
would review the legality of Security Council Resolution 748 at the merits stage.
103
 
Third, in its famous Tadić ruling, the ICTY incidentally reviewed—at length—the 
legality of the Security Council resolution by which it had been established, eventually 
affirming it.
104
 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) later did the same—
although less extensively—in Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi.105 
Fourth, the ICC, according to Article 19(1) of its Statute,
106
 is entitled, and indeed 
obliged, to “satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it.” Based on this 
provision, the ICC has the power to review the legality of two types of Security Council 
decisions, namely referral decisions according to Article 13(b) and deferral decisions 
according to Article 16 of the ICC Statute. When the Security Council refers a situation to the 
ICC, the Court must establish whether that referral respects the conditions laid down in 
Article 13(b) of the ICC Statute. Thus, it has the competence to verify, at the very least, 
whether the Security Council has followed the correct voting procedure, whether it has acted 
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and made a determination according to Article 39 of 
the Charter, and whether it has indeed adopted a resolution referring the situation to the 
                                                 
102
  See Akande, supra note 70, pp. 332–333, for this (and a further) example. 
103
  Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K.), 14 April 1992, International Court of Justice, 
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  Prosecutor v. Tadić, 2 October 1995, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals 
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ICC.
107
 Some authors suggest that the Court’s power to review referral decisions is limited to 
these ‘formal’ grounds of review and that it is not authorized to review them in substance, that 
is, to assess the grounds for the Council’s determination according to Article 39 of the Charter 
or for the referral of a situation to the Court.
108
 Others, in contrast, take the position that, 
while the Security Council undoubtedly enjoys wide discretion with regard to these 
determinations, it is still required to act within the limits of the purposes and principles of the 
Charter, so that “the Security Council cannot refer any situation to the Court.”109 Accordingly, 
the ICC would be able to determine whether the Council has acted ultra vires.
110
 Similarly, 
the ICC must satisfy itself that the request of the Security Council for the deferral of an 
investigation or prosecution is in compliance with the requirements of Article 16 of the ICC 
Statute. Thus, the Court can verify whether the deferral request is contained in a Security 
Council resolution that has been adopted under Chapter VII, following the correct voting 
procedure.
111
 It could arguably also review whether Article 16 is used—as its drafters seem to 
have intended—on a case-by-case basis by reference to a particular situation rather than to 
grant, in advance, blanket immunity for a whole category of persons.
112
 Finally, also with 
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  William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford 
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Deferral by the Security Council’ in Antonio Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary, Volume I (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) p. 627, 641 (arguing that 
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aggression to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Kampala, June 11, 2010. 
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 As was the case with U.N. Security Council, Resolution 1422, 12 July 2002 (U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422). See 
Nigel White and Robert Cryer, ‘The ICC and the Security Council: An Uncomfortable Relationship’ in José 
Doria et al. (eds.), The Legal Regime of the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Professor 
Igor Blishchenko (Martinus Njihoff, Leiden, 2009) pp. 455, 465–466, 468–469; Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmány, 
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International Law Review pp. 383–384. See Robert Cryer and Nigel White, ‘The Security Council and the 
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regard to deferrals the ICC could, according to some authors, review whether the Council has 
respected the purposes and principles of the United Nations and not acted ultra vires.
113
  
Fifth, a number of other international (quasi-)judicial bodies have examined, at least 
indirectly, decisions of the Security Council when reviewing acts of member states that 
implement these decisions. Most of these decisions concern the imposition of sanctions. The 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has repeatedly reviewed national acts 
implementing Security Council decisions.
114
 In al-Dulimi v. Switzerland, for example, a 
Chamber of the ECtHR held that action taken by a state in compliance with a sanctions 
regime of the Security Council will only be justified if that regime “protects fundamental 
rights in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the 
Convention provides”.115 In the view of the Chamber, the sanctions regime against the former 
Iraqi government under Resolution 1483 did not meet this requirement.
116
 The Grand 
Chamber observed that “where a State relies on the need to apply a Security Council 
resolution in order to justify a limitation on the rights guaranteed by the Convention, it is 
necessary for the Court to examine the wording and scope of the text of the resolution in order 
to ensure, effectively and coherently, that it is consonant with the Convention.”117 It 
concluded that, when implementing a Council resolution requiring the listing of individuals, 
states must, at the very least, allow those individuals to submit evidence to a court to seek to 
show that their inclusion on the list has been arbitrary.
118
 The U.N. Human Rights Committee, 
in Sayadi and Vinck v. Belgium, reviewed national measures implementing Security Council 
Resolution 1267 and subsequent related resolutions for their conformity with the rights 
guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
119
 finding a 
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violation of Articles 12 and 17.
120
 In the Kadi/Yusuf cases, the CFI applied a relaxed review 
of the sanctions regime established by Resolution 1267, checking its lawfulness with regard to 
jus cogens,
121
 while the European Court of Justice (ECJ) performed a full-fledged review of 
the implementing regulation of the European Union (EU) and, thereby, indirectly of the 
sanctions regime imposed by the Security Council.
122
 
Sixth, domestic courts may be required to review, as an incidental question, the 
legality of a Security Council resolution. They can do so, for example, when an action 
contesting the adoption of a domestic measure implementing the resolution itself is brought, 
when a tort action against the state is brought, or when criminal proceedings are instituted 
against individuals placed on one of the Council’s terrorist sanctions lists.123 Cases in which 
domestic courts were required to review the validity of Security Council action have included, 
for example, challenges to the Council’s power to establish the ICTY,124 to the conformity of 
the procedures of the ICTR with fair trial standards,
125
 and to the compatibility of national 
measures implementing the terrorist sanctions regime with various human rights 
guarantees.
126
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2.2.2 Review by Other Bodies and Entities 
Not only various courts, but also a number of other bodies and entities may review decisions 
of the Security Council for their compliance with international law.   
First and foremost, as is made clear by Article 24(1) of the U.N. Charter, the Security 
Council, in fulfilling its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, 
acts on behalf of the entire membership of the United Nations. Thus, the Council is 
accountable to the members: they have “a right of supervision on how this responsibility is 
exercised on their behalf.”127 Within the organization, the primary means of ensuring this 
accountability are the annual and special reports that Article 24(3) of the U.N. Charter obliges 
the Council to submit to the General Assembly, in which all members are represented. 
According to Article 15(1) of the Charter, “these reports shall include an account of the 
measures that the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace 
and security.”128 While originally the Council’s annual reports were mainly descriptive, there 
have recently been several efforts to make them more informative and analytical.
129
 This 
reflects an understanding among member states that, in order to fulfil their accountability 
function, the reports must contain explanations for the decisions taken (or not taken).
130
 The 
General Assembly is only able to scrutinize the Security Council’s acts (and omissions), 
including for their conformity with international law, if the Council explains the reasons for 
them.
131
 While the General Assembly can thus review the legality of Council action, it does 
not have the power to adopt any political or legal sanctions against it upon a report. 
Regional organizations of states may also check the lawfulness of Security Council 
action. In 1998, for instance, the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the 
Organization of African Unity adopted a resolution declaring that it would no longer comply 
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with the Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions against Libya, “owing to the fact 
that the said resolutions violate Article 27 paragraph 3, Article 33 and Article 36 paragraph 3 
of the United Nations Charter.”132 While not directly threatening disobedience, also the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has engaged in legal review of Security 
Council action. In 2008, it passed a resolution in which it found that the targeted sanctions 
system established by the Council in no way fulfils the minimum standards of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the ICCPR and thus “violate[s] the fundamental 
principles of human rights and the rule of law”. Accordingly, it urged the Council “to 
overhaul the procedural and substantive rules governing targeted sanctions.”133 
Finally, can individual member states review decisions of the Security Council for 
their compliance with international law and, if they find them to be illegal, refuse to carry 
them out? Some scholars argue that they can. There are different ways of justifying this 
position. As explained above, adopting a ‘radical’ interpretation of Article 25 of the Charter, 
one may argue that the member states are only obliged to comply with those decisions of the 
Council that are “in accordance with the present Charter” and are thus free to disobey those 
decisions that are not.
134
 Or one may assert that a Council decision in violation of 
international law constitutes an internationally wrongful act, engaging the responsibility of the 
United Nations. Disobedience by a state could then be qualified as a countermeasure, 
precluding wrongfulness.
135
 Or, finally, one may assert that a state may lawfully resist a 
Security Council resolution if it has exhausted all mechanisms available for establishing the 
illegality of that resolution and its view is supported at least by part of the international 
community.
136
 All three positions presuppose that it is possible and appropriate for states to 
determine the legality of a given Security Council decision.
137
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Not only the acts and omissions of the Security Council as a collective organ, but also those 
of its individual members are subject to legal limits. When a state participates in the decision-
making process of an international organization, this can be qualified as an act of that state 
which may entail its international responsibility. At least as long as they act under instructions 
from their home government, the voting behaviour of state representatives in international 
organizations is attributable to their state.
138
 As the Permanent Court of International Justice 
observed with regard to the Council of the League of Nations, this body was “composed of 
representatives of Members, that is to say, of persons delegated by their respective 
Governments, from whom they receive instructions and whose responsibility they engage.”139 
This equally applies to votes in the Security Council, which are cast by government 
representatives who are subject to instructions. The vote in the decision-making organ of an 
international organization is thus attributable to the member state.
140
  
The decision adopted as a result of the votes cast, in contrast, constitutes collective 
conduct of the organ that is attributable to the international organization. It is for this reason 
that the ICJ, in its judgment in Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (The 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), made a clear distinction between, on the 
one hand, Greece’s objection to the admission of the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and, on the other, 
NATO’s decision to defer the invitation to the FYROM to join NATO.141 Having concluded 
that the conduct of Greece within this international organization “can be assessed 
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independently of NATO’s decision”,142 the ICJ reviewed Greece’s objection in light of its 
treaty obligations towards the FYROM. 
It is true that according to Article 59(2) of the Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organizations (ARIO) of the International Law Commission (ILC), “[a]n act by 
a State member of an international organization done in accordance with the rules of the 
organization does not as such engage the international responsibility of that State under the 
terms of this article.”143 However, such acts may fall under the regime of state responsibility 
instead. The ILC has explicitly recognized in its Commentary to the ARIO that the fact that a 
state does not incur responsibility under the regime of international organization responsibility 
“does not imply that the State would then be free to ignore its international obligations”. 
“These obligations”, the ILC Commentary continues, “may well encompass the conduct of a 
State when it acts within an international organization”, breach of which would entail 
responsibility according to the ILC Articles on state responsibility.
144
 
The voting behaviour of a state in an international organization is thus not only 
attributable to that state, but it can also constitute a breach of an international obligation of 
that state. Whether a vote will entail international responsibility will depend on the scope and 
nature of a given obligation, in particular on whether it imposes a particular course of action 
on the state in the decision-making process of an international organization.
145
 For the present 
context, the most important treaties imposing on states a particular voting behaviour in 
international organizations are the U.N. Charter and human rights treaties. 
 
2.3.1 Legal Limits Arising Under the U.N. Charter 
When the members of the Security Council participate in debates and votes in the Council, 
they do not only represent their respective states but also act as part of an organ of the United 
Nations. More than that, the Security Council has a restricted membership and acts, according 
to Article 24(1) of the Charter, “on behalf” of all members of the United Nations. Therefore, 
the members represented in the Council have a special responsibility towards the other 
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members of the organization.
146
 The representative of Costa Rica put it as follows in the 
General Assembly: “In accordance with the provisions of the Charter, the Security Council 
acts on behalf of all Members of the United Nations. Its members, whether permanent or 
elected, represent equally all States Members of the Organization and they are, therefore, 
responsible to them.”147 The members of the Council act as delegates of all other members of 
the United Nations and can in this sense be characterized as “trustees of the international 
community”148. 
The rights of participation in the Security Council thus serve the fundamental values 
of the international community. Accordingly, they may not be exercised in a manner that 
would undermine these very values. In other words, the voting rights of the members of the 
Security Council, as “trustees of the international community”, may not be exercised 
arbitrarily but instead are subject to (legal) limits, even though these may be widely drawn.
149
  
As a very minimum, when voting in the Security Council, the Council members must 
comply with their obligation under Article 2(2) of the U.N. Charter to act in good faith. This 
legal limit on the voting behaviour in the Council has been recognized by the judges of the 
ICJ Basdevant, Winiarski, McNair, and Read in their dissenting opinion in the advisory 
opinion on Conditions of Admission. While acknowledging that, when voting in the Council, 
its members have “the right and the duty to take into account all the political considerations 
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which are in their opinion relevant to a decision”,150 they held that they do not enjoy unlimited 
freedom but must use their voting power “in good faith, in accordance with the Purposes and 
Principles of the Organization and in such a manner as not to involve any breach of the 
Charter”.151 The disagreement between the judges in the Admission case did not relate to this 
specific issue: all of them agreed “that the discretion inherent in the right to vote must be 
exercised in good faith”.152 Jean Spiropoulos has similarly argued that, although the members 
of the Council have a wide discretionary power in exercising their functions, “[l]eur pouvoir 
discrétionnaire devient une illégalité lorsqu’il est exercé de façon abusive.”153 Any vote not 
given in good faith constitutes, according to Spiropoulos, such an abuse of power.
154
 Robert 
Kolb has pointed out that any margin of discretion in voting in the Council is limited by the 
obligation to act in good faith and that even the power to veto, despite its eminently political 
nature, remains subject to the legal order and may not be abused.
155
 This is reflected in U.N. 
practice, for example in the joint statement made by the great powers in San Francisco in 
defence of the Yalta Formula, according to which “[i]t is not to be assumed … that the 
permanent members, any more than the non-permanent members, would use their ‘veto’ 
power wilfully to obstruct the operation of the Council.”156 In its Uniting for Peace resolution, 
the General Assembly refers to “the duty of the permanent members … to exercise restraint in 
the use of the veto.”157 
Accordingly, the exercise of the right to vote in the Council will amount to a breach of 
the obligation to act in good faith if it undermines the purposes and principles of the United 
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Nations.
158
 Most importantly, the Council members are obliged to employ their vote in a 
manner that coincides with the primary purpose of the organization, maintenance of 
international peace and security.
159
 Thus, it has convincingly been argued, a vote cast by a 
Council member that has nothing to do with this purpose would be illegal.
160
 An example of 
such an exercise of the voting right is the veto cast by China in 1997 against a draft resolution 
authorizing the sending of military observers to Guatemala, on the basis that Guatemala had 
recognized the government of Taiwan.
161
 In 1999, China blocked the extension of the United 
Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) to Macedonia for similar reasons. In the 
view of the Canadian representative, China’s voting behaviour was “compelled by bilateral 
concerns unrelated to UNPREDEP” and thus “constitute[d] an unfortunate and inappropriate 
use of the veto.”162 But also a concurring vote may violate the obligation to act in good faith. 
If, for example, a Council member voted in favour of a request by the Security Council for 
deferral of an investigation or prosecution according to Article 16 of the ICC Statute so that a 
person is unduly kept in custody without a trial, rather than with a view to the purposes laid 
down in Chapter VII of the Charter,
163
 this would amount to an abuse of power. 
 
2.3.2 Legal Limits Arising Under Other Treaties 
Apart from the obligation arising under Article 2(2) of the U.N. Charter, the members of the 
Security Council are also bound by other international treaties ratified by them when voting in 
the Council. For example, Council members that are parties to the ICC Statute may not act 
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contrary to its terms when exercising their voting rights in the Council.
164
 Similarly, human 
rights and humanitarian law treaties, such as the ICCPR, the ECHR, the Genocide 
Convention,
165
 and the Geneva Conventions,
166
 may require Council members to vote in a 
specific way on certain proposed resolutions.  
As a general rule, human rights obligations are owed to all individuals subject to the 
jurisdiction of the state party concerned.
167
 With regard to the ECHR, the ECtHR ruled in 
Matthews v. United Kingdom that its “Article 1 makes no distinction as to the type of rule or 
measure concerned, and does not exclude any part of the member States’ ‘jurisdiction’ from 
scrutiny under the Convention.”168 The Court held that a decision of the Council of the 
European Communities constituted an international instrument that was freely entered into by 
the United Kingdom, so that the United Kingdom was responsible for its consequences.
169
 
Thus, unlike as is the case with acts that a state is obliged to adopt due to its membership of 
an international organization,
170
 a state is responsible under Article 1 of the ECHR for the 
consequences of its voting behaviour in an international body such as the Council of the 
European Communities and thus bound by the substantive obligations of the ECHR.
171
 The 
Court confirmed this view in the Segi case. There, it stated that by taking part in the 
preparation and adoption of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) decisions, which 
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are taken by unanimity or qualified majority, each EU member state engages its 
responsibility.
172
 In our view, the same must apply with regard to the voting behaviour in the 
Security Council.
173
 Furthermore, there is no apparent reason why states should not be equally 
bound under human rights treaties other than the ECHR.
174
 
Article 103 of the U.N. Charter does not constitute an obstacle to the voting behaviour 
in the Security Council being subject to obligations under human rights treaties. Article 103 
only concerns the situation where there is a conflict between member states’ obligations under 
the Charter and their obligations under human rights treaties. Yet, while such a conflict may 
arise as a consequence of the adoption of a legally binding Security Council resolution, there 
is no conflict prior to its adoption, including at the voting stage where Council members have 
discretion as to how to vote.
175
 The ECtHR, in contrast, held in Behrami and Saramati that 
the vote of a permanent member of the Council in favour of the Chapter VII resolution at 
issue was not subject to its scrutiny. The Court argued that if it were to adjudicate on the 
legality of votes in favour of a particular Council resolution, it would hamper the effective 
conduct of the United Nations’ operations and interfere with its mission to secure 
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international peace and security.
176
 This finding, however, is not convincing. It cannot be 
reconciled with the Court’s previous jurisprudence concerning the responsibility of member 
states of an international organization
177
 and is not supported by any legal explanation but 
only some unspecified assumptions about the alleged negative impact of human rights 
obligations on the effectiveness of the system of collective security.
178
  
The obligations that may arise under human rights and humanitarian law treaties with 
regard to the voting behaviour are manifold. For instance, Council members are required to 
vote against a Security Council resolution that grants U.N. forces blanket powers and absolves 
them from complying with human rights guarantees.
179
 Similarly, when the Council 
establishes a system of targeted sanctions, Council members are obliged to use their vote in a 
way that ensures that the necessary substantive and procedural safeguards for the protection of 
human rights are built into the system.
180
 The members of such a sanctions committee of the 
Security Council may have to vote against the listing of certain individuals or, conversely, in 
favour of their delisting.
181
 Finally, it may be argued that Council members are under an 
obligation to vote in favour of (or at least not against) a resolution authorizing action that 
would be able to prevent, or bring an end to, genocide, crimes against humanity or war 
crimes.
182
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The voting behaviour of the members of the Security Council can be reviewed for its 
compliance with the legal limits set out in Section 2.3 in a number of different ways. 
There is, first of all, the possibility of a review by the ICJ. The General Assembly or 
the Security Council itself can request an advisory opinion from the Court on the question of 
whether a vote in the Council amounts to a violation of international law. Undoubtedly, this 
constitutes a legal question in the sense of Article 96 of the Charter.
183
  
Furthermore, the ICJ has confirmed that contentious proceedings can be brought 
against a state for its participation in the decision-making process of NATO.
184
 There is no 
reason why the same should not apply with regard to the U.N. Security Council. Thus, a state 
can institute contentious proceedings before the Court against a Council member, claiming 
that a vote cast by that member does not comply with the legal limits explained above or even 
trying to prevent it from voting in a specific manner.
185
 This is, in fact, exactly what Libya did 
in the Lockerbie case: Libya requested the ICJ to adopt provisional measures against the 
United Kingdom and the United States, arguing that such measures were urgently required to 
refrain them “from taking any initiative within the Security Council for the purpose of 
impairing that right to exercise jurisdiction, which Libya asks the Court to recognize.”186 
Once Security Council Resolution 748 had been adopted, Libya claimed that “the United 
Kingdom and the United States should so act as not to infringe Libya’s rights, for example by 
seeking a suspension of the relevant part of resolution 748 (1992).”187 However, the Court 
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never addressed the substance of these claims. Similarly, in 1993 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
notified the ICJ in writing that it intended to institute proceedings against the United Kingdom 
for complicity in genocide, on the grounds that the United Kingdom had opposed efforts of 
other members in the Security Council to lift the arms embargo imposed on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina later dropped its plan to lodge the complaint, 
apparently in response to a pledge by the United Kingdom to increase humanitarian aid and to 
promote a negotiated political settlement.
188
 
With specific regard to obligations under human rights treaties, the supervisory bodies 
established by these treaties (such as the U.N. Human Rights Committee and the ECtHR) can 
review the voting behaviour of those Security Council members that are parties to the 
respective treaty for compliance with the obligations under that treaty. This can occur, first, in 
the context of state reporting procedures, as far as the respective human rights treaty provides 
for such a procedure.
189
 Second, a state party to a human rights treaty could bring an inter-
state complaint against a Council member that is party to the same treaty, alleging that its vote 
in favour of a Security Council resolution that results in human rights violations breaches its 
obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.
190
 Third—and, from a practical 
point of view, most importantly—a review of the voting behaviour is also possible in the 
context of an individual complaint. As a general rule, neither a Security Council resolution as 
such nor, therefore, votes contributing to its adoption can form the subject of an individual 
complaint: Security Council resolutions are typically not ‘self-executing’ (that is, they do not 
have a direct effect in domestic law) but need to be implemented by states, so that individuals 
will normally lack the victim status required to bring an individual complaint.
191
 What an 
individual can claim, however, is that a measure by a state party implementing a Security 
Council resolution violates the respective human rights treaty. If the state, at the time of the 
adoption of the resolution, had been a member of the Council and now tried to invoke Article 
103 of the U.N. Charter as a justification for the implementing measure, the supervisory body 
would have to review its voting behaviour. If the state had voted in favour of the resolution, 
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the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the human rights treaty would bar it 
from invoking Article 103 of the Charter.
192
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The Security Council does not operate in a legal vacuum. Neither is the Council completely 
free to act as it wants, nor are the Council members completely free to decide how to vote. 
Both (in)action of the Security Council as a collective body and the voting behaviour of its 
individual members are subject to legal limits. Compliance with these legal limits imposed on 
the Council and the members can be reviewed in various ways. 
However, a meaningful legal review of the Security Council’s acts (or omissions) and 
of the votes of its members is only possible if the reviewing body or entity knows the reasons 
for them. Not only what the Council decides must be subject to legal limits, but also how it 
decides. In Section 3 we will argue that, in certain situations, the Security Council and its 
members are already today obliged to give reasons for their decisions and votes, respectively. 
In Section 4 we sketch out a proposal to introduce, de lege ferenda, a comprehensive duty to 
explain in a public meeting every vote cast in the Security Council. Providing explanations for 
decisions and votes would be in the best interest of the Council and its members themselves: 
without explanations, the reviewing body or entity will be more likely to come to the 
conclusion that the respective decisions or votes are not supported by sufficient reasons and 
thus illegal. 
 
3 A Duty to Give Reasons – De Lege Lata 
In certain situations, there is already today, de lege lata, an obligation incumbent on the 
Security Council to give reasons for its decisions and, respectively, on its members to explain 
their votes in the Council, although this duty is not implemented. In particular, a duty to give 
reasons may arise, first, from the due process rights guaranteed by international human rights 
law (3.1) and, second, from the responsibility to protect (3.2). 
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3.1 Due Process Rights under International Human Rights Law 
As part of the expansion of its scope of activity, the Security Council has started to adopt 
more and more measures that directly affect specific individuals, groups or corporate entities. 
The Council thus increasingly assumes functions that are normally performed by courts or 
administrative bodies. 
When the Council acts in a manner that directly affects important interests of non-state 
actors, the due process guarantees provided by international human rights law become 
applicable. As pointed out in Section 2.1, there are compelling reasons to assume that the 
Security Council is bound to respect human rights. This applies all the more so with regard to 
the rights building the focus of the present analysis, the rights to a fair hearing and an 
effective remedy. These rights belong to a universal minimum standard of due process which 
can be considered as forming part of customary international law and as also being protected 
by general principles of law in the meaning of Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute.
193
 
The right to be informed about the reasons for a decision affecting individual interests 
is one of the key due process rights under international human rights law. This right is rooted 
in the right to a fair hearing as it is guaranteed by Article 10 of the UDHR, Article 14(1) of 
the ICCPR, Article 6(1) of the ECHR, Article 8(1) of the American Convention on Human 
Rights (ACHR),
194
 and Article 7(1) of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR).
195
 The right to a fair hearing does not only apply in criminal proceedings but in all 
proceedings concerning the determination of a person’s “rights and obligations in a suit at 
law”196 or “civil rights and obligations”,197 which includes certain administrative 
proceedings.
198
 It requires decision-makers to “indicate with sufficient clarity the grounds on 
which they based their decision,”199 although not every point raised in argument must be dealt 
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with.
200
 Only if a reasoned decision is given is it possible for the individual concerned to 
know that his or her arguments have been properly examined and to exercise any available 
right of appeal, and only then can the public scrutinize the administration of justice.
201
 
The right to learn the reasons of a decision also follows from the right to have an 
effective remedy. Article 8 of the UDHR, Article 2(3) of the ICCPR, Article 13 of the ECHR 
and Article 25 of the ACHR all provide that everyone whose rights have been violated shall 
have an effective remedy. A remedy may, however, only be characterized as ‘effective’ if the 
person concerned or, at the very least, the body that reviews the impugned act is informed 
about the reasons behind it; it is only possible to understand and review an act if one knows 
the reasons for it.
202
 Thus, the ECtHR has ruled that proceedings for reviewing a deportation 
order, in which the person concerned is only given an outline of the grounds for the 
deportation and the findings of the reviewing panel themselves are not disclosed, do not 
constitute an ‘effective’ remedy.203 
As far as the Security Council has assumed the role of a (criminal) court and created 
tribunals for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, it has met its obligation to provide reasons for its decisions by transposing 
it on these tribunals. The statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR, which were adopted by 
resolutions of the Security Council,
204
 both provide that judgments must be accompanied by a 
reasoned opinion in writing, to which separate or dissenting opinions may be appended.
205
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Other decisions of the tribunals and orders of its judges must, as a general rule, equally be 
supported by reasons.
206
 
The situation is different, however, as far as the Security Council, taking on the role of 
an administrative body, has adopted other measures that directly affect non-state actors. By 
far the most important of these are sanctions imposed by the Council that are targeted against 
specific individuals and non-state entities.
207
 Unlike as with the international criminal 
tribunals, the Council has so far failed to impose on its sanctions committees a duty to give 
reasons for their decisions. 
There are currently 13 sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council in place, 
each administered by its own sanctions committee, that is, a subsidiary body of the Council 
whose composition reflects its own.
208
 The oldest of the existing sanctions regimes, 
concerning Somalia, was established in 1992
209
 and the most recent, concerning South Sudan, 
in 2015.
210
 All of these regimes are designed to, among other things, designate specific 
individuals and non-state entities as targets of sanctions,
211
 although in the case of one regime 
no one has actually been placed on the list so far.
212
 Usually, the measures imposed on the 
listed individuals and entities include a travel ban, an assets freeze, and an arms embargo. 
In the case of most sanctions regimes, the listed individuals and entities are linked to 
the government of a country. This is not the case, however, with the sanctions regime 
established according to Security Council Resolution 1267 of 1999, which targets individuals 
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and entities belonging to, or associated with, Al-Qaida and/or the Taliban.
213
 Due to the high 
number of individuals and entities subject to it, this sanctions regime, often simply referred to 
as ‘the terrorist sanctions regime’, has attracted the greatest attention.214 
Given the great variety of sanctions regimes and the differences in the procedures that 
are applicable before them, it is difficult to make generalized statements about the 
compatibility of targeted sanctions with human rights guarantees. In particular, this will 
depend to a considerable extent on the nature of the sanctions that are imposed on a given 
individual or entity. In certain cases, the effects of including a person or entity on a sanctions 
list may be sufficiently serious to amount to the determination of a “criminal charge”, 
triggering the fair hearing guarantees listed above.
215
 Even if such a qualification is rejected, 
these guarantees will in most cases be applicable on the basis that listing concerns the 
determination of ”rights and obligations in a suit at law” or ”civil rights”, respectively, as the 
placing of a person on a publicly available sanctions list can be said to amount to an attack on 
his or her reputation and/or may entail an interference with property rights.
216
 Thus, the 
respective sanctions committee would have to provide a fair hearing, which, as explained 
above, includes the right to be informed about the reasons for a decision, in the present 
context the reasons for the listing. Even if one was to conclude that the guarantee of a fair 
hearing does not apply to targeted sanctions, listed individuals or entities would still have the 
right to an effective remedy against the listing and its consequences. Any such remedy can 
only be qualified as ‘effective’, if the sanctions committee informs the reviewing body of the 
reasons that led to the listing, although these reasons must not necessarily be made publicly 
available.
217
 
In short, when the Security Council establishes sanctions committees it should—just 
as it did in the case of the international criminal tribunals—impose on them a duty to give 
reasons for their listing decisions. There are two basic formats in which this duty can be 
implemented. Either the individual committee members are obliged to explain their positions 
with regard to the listing of individuals or entities in the committee meetings and the records 
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of these meetings are made available to the public (or, at the very least, to the parties 
concerned). Or the respective sanctions committee, acting as a collective body, provides 
reasons in writing for its listing decisions.  
As explained in Section 1 above, neither has happened. The procedures of the 
sanctions committees are notoriously obscure. The committees mostly meet in informal 
consultations, which are not recorded. As far as formal meetings are held at all, they take 
place almost entirely behind closed doors, with their records not being published. None of the 
sanctions committees directly informs the individuals and entities concerned of their listing, 
let alone of the reasons for the listing. In 2009, the Security Council at least directed the 1267 
Committee to make accessible on its website ‘narrative summaries of reasons for listing’ the 
respective individuals and entities, which are mainly based on information provided by the 
designating state(s).
218
 Some other committees now also publish such ‘narrative summaries’. 
Nevertheless, the sanctions committees are still not obliged to publish fully reasoned 
decisions specifying the supporting evidence. 
This has, accordingly, been criticized by a number of courts in the context of the 
review of measures implementing Security Council resolutions, referred to in Section 2.2.1. 
The ECJ, in Kadi and Al Barakaat, observed with regard to the Al Qaida/Taliban sanctions 
regime that the 1267 Committee was not required to inform the designated persons or entities 
of the reasons for listing them or refusing to delist them.
219
 However, communication of the 
grounds for inclusion on the list was required, first, so that the listed person could defend their 
rights in the best possible conditions and decide whether to bring legal proceedings and, 
second, in order to put the reviewing body fully in a position in which it may carry out the 
review of the lawfulness of the implementing measure.
220
 The ECJ concluded that the right to 
be heard and the right to effective judicial review enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the 
ECHR
221
 “were patently not respected”.222 With regard to the Iraqi sanctions system, the 
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ECtHR has ruled that those subject to an assets freeze as a consequence of their inclusion on 
the list established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1483 are entitled, in accordance 
with Article 6 of the ECHR, to have access to a court that has the power to verify whether 
their inclusion on the list was arbitrary.
223
 This would seem to imply a duty on behalf of the 
Sanctions Committee to give reasons for the listing, as otherwise a meaningful court 
challenge would not be possible.
224
 Finally, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe has passed a resolution stating that targeted sanctions imposed by the Security Council 
such as freezing of assets and travel restrictions must meet “minimum procedural standards 
under the rule of law”, which include “the right for everyone to be notified promptly and fully 
informed of the charges held against himself or herself, and of the decision taken and the 
reasons for that decision”.225 The Parliamentary Assembly strongly deplored that the 
individual or entity concerned “is usually neither informed of the request, nor given the 
possibility to be heard, nor even necessarily informed about the decision taken.”226 
 
3.2 Responsibility to Protect 
Apart from the due process guarantees under international human rights law, also the so-
called ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) gives rise to an obligation of the Security Council to 
explain its decisions and of its members to give reasons for their voting behaviour. 
The concept of R2P was developed by the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which was established by the Canadian government. In its 
report of 2001, the ICISS set out the two building blocks of the concept.
227
 The first element 
is that state sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility to protect 
populations lies with the territorial state. Second, however, “[w]here a population is suffering 
serious harm … and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle 
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of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.”228 The most important 
expression of a recognition of R2P by states is the General Assembly’s World Summit 
Outcome Document of 2005, in which the heads of state and government declared that  
“we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate 
and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”229  
The World Summit Outcome Document is also significant in that it limits the scope of 
R2P as it was originally set out by the ICISS to the core international crimes as defined in 
Articles 6 to 8 of the ICC Statute, that is, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity 
(including ethnic cleansing). 
The legal nature of R2P is contentious. While some states find it to be a “sophisticated 
normative legal framework based on international law”230, others describe it as a “political 
commitment”231. The High-level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change 
characterized R2P, and the corresponding obligation of the Security Council to take action in 
certain situations, as an “emerging norm”232. Given that the concept of R2P rose so quickly 
and is still in a state of flux, one can probably not confidently say much more about its legal 
nature than to point out that “the concept currently encompasses a spectrum of different 
normative propositions that vary considerably in their status and degree of legal support.”233 
One proposition that finds very broad support is that the host state has the responsibility to 
protect populations on its territory from large-scale atrocities.
234
 Much more controversial is 
the proposition that the United Nations, acting through the Security Council, or other states 
have a positive obligation to intervene to protect populations under the concept of R2P. 
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The position that such an obligation is incumbent on the Security Council relies, first 
of all, on the premise that the Council is subject to certain legal limits, which, as explained in 
Section 2.1, notably include human rights. As also explained in that Section, not only the 
Council’s actions but also its omissions may be illegal: in certain situations, the Council is 
under a legal obligation to act. With regard to R2P this means that it could be argued that 
failure of the Security Council to authorize an intervention capable of protecting a population 
from core crimes, such as genocide, constitutes an illegal act, triggering the responsibility of 
the United Nations.
235
 
In support of the proposition that other states have a positive obligation to intervene in 
R2P situations, one may point out that virtually all states of the world are parties to the four 
Geneva Conventions and the great majority of states, including nearly all current Security 
Council members,
236
 are parties to the Genocide Convention. These treaties, which address 
two of the three categories of core crimes in which the concept of R2P is rooted, contain 
provisions that are aimed at the prevention of their violation by other states.
237
 The obligation 
incumbent on states parties to the Genocide Convention under Article 1 to prevent genocide 
does not presuppose a territorial link
238
 and will be violated if, in the words of the ICJ, “the 
State manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, 
and which might have contributed to preventing the genocide.”239 Common Article 1 of the 
Geneva Conventions similarly obliges states parties “to respect and to ensure respect” for the 
Conventions, which means that every party “whether or not it is a party to a specific conflict, 
is under an obligation to ensure that the requirements of the instruments in question are 
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complied with.”240 The precise content of this positive obligation is, however, rather unclear 
and may vary from one state to another depending on parameters such as the capacity to 
influence effectively persons likely to commit core crimes, the relationship with the host state, 
and the extent of the harm occurring.
241
 Furthermore, the obligation may not have to be (or 
even may not be) discharged unilaterally, but rather through multilateral efforts to protect.  
For members of the Security Council, this obligation to engage in cooperative efforts 
to prevent core crimes could, in view of their special responsibility towards the international 
community,
242
 take the form of an obligation to vote in favour of a resolution authorizing an 
intervention.
243
 Accordingly, various states and international bodies have repeatedly called on 
the Council members, and especially the P5, not to block resolutions authorizing action 
designed to prevent, or bring an end to, mass atrocities.
244
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It would probably be premature to claim that this means that there is already now, de 
lege lata, a “hard and fast legal obligation”245 on the Security Council to authorize an 
intervention every time an R2P situation arises and/or on the members of the Council to vote 
in favour of a proposed resolution authorizing such an intervention. What can be confidently 
asserted, however, is that the Security Council and its members may not remain completely 
inactive in the face of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. Where a potential 
R2P situation arises, the Council and its members must at least convene a meeting, assess the 
situation, consider the different options and, finally, “employ all means reasonably 
available”246 to prevent the commission of core crimes.247 Council members may not block a 
resolution aimed at protecting a population from core crimes without at least having 
considered the relevant facts and positions or merely based on political reasons that are not 
directly related to the R2P situation at issue.
248
 
In other words, where there is evidence that core crimes are being committed, or are 
about to be committed, there exists a legal presumption that the Security Council and its 
members may not simply ignore these crimes but must take some action to fulfil their 
responsibility to protect.
249
 The rise of the R2P concept has thus led to a reversal of the 
burden of justification: in R2P situations, not intervention but inaction must be justified.
250
 If 
a Council member votes against a proposed resolution authorizing intervention, it must state 
its reasons for doing so. Due to their power to block a Security Council decision on their own, 
a particularly strict obligation to explain their voting behaviour is incumbent on the permanent 
members, whereas the requirements with regard to explanations given by non-permanent 
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members are somewhat relaxed. This procedural obligation is an indispensable component of 
the R2P concept.
251
 The perhaps most important merit of this concept is that it has developed 
a set of objective criteria to determine in which situations an intervention is called for and 
what standards it must meet. Only if the Council members are obliged to give reasons for their 
voting behaviour, is it possible to understand which of these criteria they think are (not) met 
and thus to assess whether the Security Council as an organ of the United Nations and its 
individual members live up to their responsibility to protect populations from core crimes.  
 
4 A Duty to Give Reasons – De Lege Ferenda 
In this last Section, we will first present the merits of a duty to give reasons for votes cast in 
the Security Council by elucidating the foundations this duty has in discourse theory and 
demonstrating the advantages it entails with regard to quality of decision-making, legal 
certainty, and accountability (4.1). We shall then sketch out our proposal for a duty to give 
reasons and show how this duty could be implemented de lege ferenda (4.2).  
 
4.1 The Merits of Reason-Giving 
4.1.1 Discourse Theory and the Rhetorical Community 
Our proposal for a duty to give reasons for votes cast in the Security Council is based on a 
discourse theoretical approach that follows in the tradition of Jürgen Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action. This theory did not only have a major impact in political science but, 
more recently, it has also been applied to the legal realm.
252
 We draw on these legal accounts 
to present the specific advantages of reason-giving in the context of the Security Council. In 
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line with the discourse theoretical foundation of our approach, we adopt a constructivist view 
of international relations. We believe that the international sphere is, to a large extent, socially 
constructed, that is, created by intersubjective and institutionalized understandings. The 
identity, the interests, and therefore also the behaviour of states and other international actors 
are continuously shaped and reshaped by social practices such as discourse, persuasion, 
collective learning, socialization, institutionalization, etc.
253
 This approach is opposed to the 
realist view, according to which states are unitary actors that pursue their own national 
interests, which are characterized as being predetermined: formed without any social 
interaction with other actors in the international realm.
254
 In order to grasp the significance of 
discourse theory for the case we are making, it is first necessary to briefly outline Habermas’s 
theory of communicative action.  
Habermas’s discourse theoretical approach is best understood as a late modern attempt 
to explain rationality.
255
 For Habermas, rationality is neither something objective nor 
something subjective, but rather the result of a continuous communicative process of forming, 
criticizing, and revising conclusions. In Habermas’s view, the way rational conclusions can be 
reached is by uttering speech acts that imply specific validity claims (Geltungsansprüche). 
These validity claims are subject to the assessment by the participants of the rational 
discourse. In this discourse, it is possible to influence other persons’ actions if the claim one 
presents possesses sufficient rational force.
256
 In this sense, a discourse of the Habermasian 
type is an intersubjective forum for uttering, reviewing, and criticizing validity claims.
257
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How exactly should this discourse look like? In the ideal-type discursive situation that 
Habermas devises—the so-called “ideal speech situation”258—all participants in the discourse 
have equal weight to make claims and assess and criticize others’ arguments. In this ideal 
situation, all coercion must be eliminated so that only the “unforced force of the better 
argument”259 prevails. The type of reasoning which, according to Habermas, should be used 
to find the better argument is communicative action. In contrast to instrumental and strategic 
action, which aim at a person’s own success (solitarily in the case of instrumental action, 
socially by way of persuading others in the case of strategic action), communicative action is 
oriented towards reaching mutual understanding by exchanging arguments.
260
 Reasons, in this 
setting, play a crucial role because they allow persons to justify their claims to others. If the 
reasons are good enough, they may convince others of the argument and lead to an unforced 
consensus. 
What is particularly important for the context of Security Council decisions is the fact 
that, in Habermas’s theory, not only empirical statements can be vindicated in rational 
discourse but also commands and value-judgments,
261
 which include normative claims.
262
 The 
claims made in and around the Security Council are of a predominantly political and legal 
nature and are rarely merely empirical. Because legal and political claims are generally 
normative claims, they can be vindicated in rational discourse. According to Habermas, this 
means that such legal and political claims can be found to be true, as long as we can engage in 
a discourse about them and are able to reach a consensus that is based on the best argument.
263
 
What this rough sketch of Habermas’s theory of communicative action reveals is that 
normative claims like the ones made in the Security Council can form the object of rational 
discourse. In this discourse, the claim supported with the best reasons will prove to be the 
better argument and convince the participants. In our view, such a discursive environment in 
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which people engage in the exchange of rational arguments is best described as a “rhetorical 
community”264. Depending on the nature of this community, different languages will be 
spoken. In the discourse in and around the Security Council, the languages that are primarily 
spoken are the languages of politics and law, although, for example, the language of morality 
can sometimes also play a role. These languages not only determine the conditions based on 
which actors may participate in the discourse but they also “establish … roles and relations 
and voices, positions from which and audiences to which one may speak.”265 Each participant 
of the rhetorical community in and around the Security Council will propose certain political 
and/or legal claims and will support them with reasons. Depending on the strength of these 
reasons, other participants will (or will not) be convinced by the claims. In doing so, the 
participants in this rhetorical community shape and reshape the conclusions that are being 
drawn from the Council’s political and legal framework. 
A sceptic might question whether discourse theory can indeed be meaningfully applied 
to the realm of the Security Council. Is the Security Council not, above all, a forum for power 
politics and hence the very opposite of an ideal speech situation? The sceptic will point out 
that, contrary to the Habermasian ideal, not all members of the Security Council have the 
same access to the discourse. For example, the permanent members possess the veto power, 
which allows them to discard all non-procedural matters.
266
 Also, as explained in Section 1.1, 
some of the informal Security Council meetings, such as the ‘Group of Friends’ and the 
‘Contact Group’, are only open to some of the Council members. For these reasons, 
deliberations in the Security Council are greatly unbalanced, so that, it could be argued, most 
(if not all) arguments based on discourse theory are bound to fail when it comes to the 
Security Council. 
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We do, of course, not deny the existence of asymmetries within the Security Council. 
However, we argue that the virtues of reason-giving also apply to speech situations that are 
not ideal. In fact, Habermas himself does not hold that real-life discourses could measure up 
to ideal speech situations.
267
 Instead, he points out that the idea of an ideal speech situation is 
a counterfactual standard that allows for the assessment of the quality of an argument.
268
 It is 
obvious that in real life, self-interest based arguments by powerful actors are ubiquitous. Yet 
this does not mean that arguments used in communicative action (that is, reasoned arguments) 
are completely absent in the debate.
269
 If such arguments are made at least to some extent, 
then critics are enabled to come into play and to point out that there is a gap between a 
participant’s arguments and actions (this will later be discussed under the term ‘discursive 
opening’).270 Thus, in order for our theory to get off the ground, it is sufficient that reasoned 
discourse takes place to a minimal extent.  
As Ian Johnstone has pointed out, such a minimally reasoned exchange already exists 
in and around the Security Council today.
271
 What is necessary (and sufficient) for such a 
minimally reasoned debate to occur is “a sense of being in a relationship of some duration, 
from which common meanings and expectations have emerged, and of being engaged in an 
enterprise the general purpose of which all understand in roughly the same way.”272 In the 
case of the Security Council, these common meanings and expectations derive from the legal 
limits set out in Section 2.1 above, in particular those contained in the U.N. Charter. This 
framework structures the debates in the Council, defining which arguments are acceptable or 
convincing and which ones are not. In the case of certain, particularly far-reaching 
resolutions, the Council has even found it necessary to render the process leading up to their 
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adoption more open and inclusive, which “suggest[s] that a moderately inclusive deliberative 
process is not only possible but also understood to be necessary.”273 As a consequence, the 
decisions of the Security Council can, despite the existing asymmetries, be understood to 
result from the discursive processes that are taking place within and around the Council. 
 
4.1.2 Reasons for Giving Reasons 
Having thus rebutted the objection that reasoned discourse cannot occur in an imperfect 
speech setting such as the Security Council, we have set the stage for our argument in favour 
of a duty to give reasons for votes cast in the Council. The starting point for this argument is 
the fact that, when confronted with an audience, states will seek to justify their positions with 
reasons relating to common interests rather than merely with their own national interests.
274
 
This social norm is based on the assumption that actions which affect others will be justified 
with reasons that these others can endorse.
275
 In contrast, where states are not expected to 
explain their actions in public, as is the case with regard to decision-making in the Security 
Council and its committees at the moment, they are likely to base them on pure self-interest.  
What can be gained from the fact that, according to the aforementioned social norm, 
states tend to give non-self-interested reasons when justifying their actions in public? What 
are the benefits of exposing the members of the Security Council to an open discourse in 
which they need to provide other-regarding reasons for their votes? In what follows, we will 
argue that a duty to give reasons in the Security Council has three major virtues. First, it will 
improve the quality of Security Council decisions. Second, it will lead to an increase in legal 
certainty. And third, it will improve the accountability of the Security Council as a whole and 
of its members. 
 
4.1.2.1 Quality 
A duty to give reasons for votes cast in the Security Council will rationalize the Council’s 
decision-making process and, ultimately, improve the quality of the adopted decisions. The 
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reason for this is threefold. First, if decision-makers have to justify their decisions, they are 
more likely to exchange information and expertise, to carefully assess the available evidence, 
to weigh the different positions, and to reflect on their choices before making a decision.
276
 
This allows them to be more successful at finding the decision that is best suited for the case 
at hand.
277
 Second, under a duty to give reasons, decision-makers are more likely to adopt 
reasonable decisions because they need to persuade others, including those most affected by 
the decisions.
278
 Since others will be able to examine and assess the justifications provided by 
the decision-maker, selfish and immoral arguments as well as arguments based on prejudice 
are likely to be suppressed.
279
 Thus, only a limited range of reasons can be invoked in order to 
justify decisions. In particular, decision-makers have fewer options to adopt decisions that are 
based on self-interested reasons.
280
 As Mathilde Cohen points out, “the duty to give reasons 
pushes decision-makers to pick the just outcomes.”281 Third, decisions based on grounds that 
can be endorsed by others will in the long run lead to an improvement of decision-making in 
general. Future decision-makers are more likely to base their decisions on the non-self-
interested reasons that antecedent decision-makers have given.
282
  
It could be objected that, if members of the Security Council are obliged to provide 
reasons for their votes, they will simply give hypocritical reasons. In other words, they will 
pay lip service to the common good, while continuing to vote in a self-interested manner. If 
they start to ‘talk the talk’ of peace and international security, for example, they will merely 
do so for instrumental and strategic purposes.
283 
Therefore, the objection goes, a duty to give 
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reasons will cause an increase in hypocrisy rather than an actual improvement of the quality 
of decisions.
 
This objection can be refuted by drawing on the notion of the so-called “civilizing 
force of hypocrisy”284. Jon Elster, who coined the term, argues that the fact that actors adopt 
impartial arguments—even if only for strategic reasons—has a beneficial effect because it 
exerts a civilizing force upon them.
285
 This civilizing force can be characterized as a two-
stage process. At a first stage, states adjust to international pressures and public criticism by 
making some concessions and by beginning to ‘talk the talk’ that the public wants to hear, 
albeit only for instrumental or strategic reasons. They do so, not because they believe in the 
values they publicly support, but because they think that it will reduce those pressures and 
maximize their benefits. For example, a member of the Security Council may adopt a human 
rights-based explanation for its vote, although its real motives are purely strategic. Once states 
employ other-regarding language such as human rights, however, they enter the second stage. 
At this stage, a process of argumentative discourse in the Habermasian sense begins to take 
effect. Once states start to use impartial rather than self-interested arguments, that is, once 
they start to ‘talk the talk’—even if in a merely hypocritical manner—, they enter a discursive 
realm which is characterized by argumentation, persuasion, and criticism.
286
 By adopting 
arguments that are at odds with their practices, states create a “discursive opening”287. Once 
they give way to pressures and start to use arguments based on non-self-interested reasons to 
justify their decisions, their critics are able to step in and challenge them for not complying in 
practice with the standards and values they publicly endorse:
288
 “If you are really committed 
to stopping these massive human rights violations, then why do you veto the resolution?” This 
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criticism can induce states to conform their policies to their public statements.
289
 To put it 
differently, what actors in the rhetorical community in and around the Security Council would 
start to do is to “cue”290 the (other) members of the Council by criticizing them for votes that 
are based on illegitimate reasons. Cueing is designed to induce them to adopt other reasons 
and to vote in conformity with the law and common values.
291
 This process of cueing or 
pointing the finger at other actors is, as José Alvarez observes, especially important on the 
international level, which—in contrast to the domestic level—is characterized by relatively 
few enforcement mechanisms.
292
 What is more, as Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink argue, 
“the more [states] ‘talk the talk’ … the more they entangle themselves in a … discourse which 
they cannot escape in the long run”293. This process of “self-entrapment”294 may then be 
reinforced by a process of self-persuasion: over time, public officials may come to believe 
themselves in the policy positions they advocate in public.
295
 In order to reduce cognitive 
dissonance,
296
 officials may eventually “begin believing in what they initially simply 
pretended they believed in.”297 
At this point, critics might intervene by questioning whether the psychological 
concepts of cognitive dissonance and self-persuasion can be transferred from human beings to 
states.
298
 In other words, what has been stated above might be correct for public officials, but 
does not suffice to explain a change in the behaviour of states. Ryan Goodman and Derek 
Jinks have presented a reply to this objection by pointing out that acculturation processes do 
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not only occur in individuals but also in large-scale organizations like states.
299
 Macro-level 
developments (that is, developments on the international level such as the ratification of a 
human rights treaty), they argue, have an effect on micro-level developments by influencing 
relevant individual actors (for example government officials, NGO activists, journalists or 
ordinary citizens).
300
 These individual actors, in turn, have an impact on the state’s laws and 
policies. Hence, according to Goodman and Jinks, there is a “macro-micro-macro causal 
explanation”301 that accounts for the socialization of states. Following this explanation, we 
argue that through macro-micro-macro processes, an internalization of internationally shared 
values can also take place with regard to the member states of the Security Council. They, too, 
can come to believe their own impartial arguments and adapt their behaviour to public 
expectations.
302
 Thus, Council members can undergo a process of identity change in the sense 
that they will come to conceive of the once hypocritically adopted norms as the “normal thing 
to do”303. 
In summary, we argue that a duty to give reasons will lead Council members to justify 
their votes by invoking reasons that relate to common values (rather than their own interests) 
and that this will, in the long term, influence their voting behaviour and result in qualitatively 
better decisions. 
 
4.1.2.2 Legal Certainty 
Secondly, a duty to give reasons for votes cast in the Security Council will lead to an increase 
in legal certainty. Legal certainty is widely seen as constituting one of the primary pillars of 
the rule of law.
304
 The rule of law requires that laws and decisions are, in the words of the 
ECtHR, “sufficiently precise to allow the person … to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable 
                                                 
299
  Goodman and Jinks, supra note 289, p. 38. 
300
  Ibid., p. 40. 
301
  Ibid. 
302
  See Francisco J. Granados, ‘Intertwined Cultural and Relational Environments of Organizations’ (2005) 83 
Social Forces p. 885, DOI: 10.1353/sof.2005.0032. 
303
  Risse and Sikkink, supra note 269, p. 17. 
304
  James R Maxeiner, ‘Some Realism About Legal Certainty in the Globalization of the Rule of Law’ in 
Mortimer Sellers and Tadeusz Tomaszewski (eds.), The Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective: Ius 
Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice (Springer, Dordrecht, 2010) p. 41. 
56 
in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail.”305 In a similar vein, 
Cohen argues that people in legal systems ought to be able to “know in advance and in stable 
and general terms what is required by the law so that they can organize their life accordingly”, 
adding that “[i]f law is to bind people, they must be able, without undue difficulty, to find out 
what it is.”306 Without knowing the reasons for a law or a decision, however, it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to understand its content. Thus, reason-giving may be characterized as “one of 
the essential properties of the concept of the rule of law, if not the essential one.”307 
Accordingly, legal systems that are based on the rule of law, including those of 
international organizations, typically prescribe a duty to give reasons. Article 296(2) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),
308
 for example, stipulates: “Legal 
acts shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall refer to any proposals, 
initiatives, recommendations, requests or opinions required by the Treaties.” In a case that 
touched on Article 296(2) TFEU, the ECJ—in line with the aforementioned jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR—argued that statements of reasons “must disclose in a clear and unequivocal 
fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted that measure in such a way as 
to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for it.”309 
Despite the fact that the Security Council is a highly political body, it is, as has been 
pointed out in Section 2.1 above, subject to the rule of law. The paradigm of legal certainty 
therefore also applies in the context of the Security Council. The states, non-state entities, and 
individuals affected by a given decision of the Security Council (or one of its committees) 
must be able to understand what it requires of them and what consequences non-compliance 
may entail. Forcing the Council members to submit reasons for their voting behaviour and 
thus to provide substantive information will allow the affected actors to assess more 
accurately the content of a specific decision. Knowing the reasons behind a decision will, in 
turn, allow them to forecast with more precision what decisions the Security Council is going 
to adopt in the future. In this sense, reason-giving can be seen as a remedy for the epistemic 
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deficits that result from the lack of transparency that, as explained in Section 1, currently 
characterizes Security Council deliberations.
310
  
Thus, requiring members of the Security Council to disclose the reasons for their 
voting behaviour will increase legal certainty and thereby also compliance with the rule of 
law. 
 
4.1.2.3 Accountability 
A duty to give reasons will, lastly, improve the accountability of the Security Council and its 
members. The most widely accepted understanding of the concept of accountability—its ‘core 
sense’—associates it with “the process of being called ‘to account’ to some authority for 
one’s actions”311, which entails some form of oversight and control.312   
Although there is no final arbiter of actions of the Security Council, there is a range of 
different actors to which the Council may be called to account for its decisions and the 
Council members for their voting behaviour. As explained in Section 2, courts or quasi-
judicial bodies that can engage in a legal review of Security Council action or of votes cast in 
the Council include the ICJ, the international criminal tribunals, the ICC, the ECtHR, the ECJ, 
the U.N. Human Rights Committee, and domestic courts. In addition, also non-judicial 
entities such as the General Assembly, regional organizations, and the U.N. member states 
scrutinize Security Council action for its conformity with international law. Furthermore, 
there are lawyers, representatives of NGOs, and ordinary citizens who take part in the 
rhetorical community around the Security Council.
313
 The languages of law and politics 
provide the entirety of this community with the tools for reviewing and assessing what the 
Security Council members decide. The rhetorical community engages the Council in “an 
ongoing dialogue, an ‘expressive’ mode of review”314.  
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Accountability requires transparency with regard to decision-making. This holds 
especially true for the decision-making organ of an international organization on which not all 
members are represented, such as the Security Council. In its report on the accountability of 
international organizations, the International Law Association (ILA) observed that “[n]on-
plenary organs acting on behalf of the whole membership under the governing provisions of 
an IO have a special obligation to act as transparently as possible” and should hold their 
meetings, in principle, in public.
315
 Likewise, the reasons for the positions adopted by the 
states represented in that organ must be transparent. The ILA report therefore includes as one 
of the key requirements to achieve effective accountability that “organs of an IO should state 
the reasons for their decisions or particular courses of action whenever necessary for the 
assessment of their proper functioning or otherwise relevant from the point of view of their 
accountability.”316 
A duty to give reasons for votes cast in the Security Council is a necessary prerequisite 
for the meaningful exercise of the various ways of controlling and holding accountable the 
Council and its members. Those affected by a decision of (or a vote in) the Security Council 
can only effectively examine and, if necessary, contest it, if they know the reasons that have 
led to its adoption. Equally, it will, as a general rule, be inevitable for the body charged with 
reviewing a decision or voting behaviour to know its rationales in order to be able to assess its 
conformity with international law.  
This holds even more true for decisions of the Security Council (and its subsidiary 
bodies) than for those of other international organs. Security Council resolutions are typically 
drafted in haste and under considerable political pressure.
317
 Accordingly, the wording of their 
operative parts is often unclear and vague. Sometimes the text of a resolution is deliberately 
left ambiguous so as to ensure approval by all Council members.
318
 The preambular 
paragraphs of resolutions, in turn, are often simply used to ‘dump’ contentious proposals and 
only rarely fully reflect the object and purpose of the resolution.
319
 Similar problems affect the 
resolutions that set out the terms of reference of the various sanctions committees.
320
 Thus, it 
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would be crucial to have access to the preparatory work of Security Council resolutions to 
make sense of them. The travaux préparatoires of a resolution include working papers, drafts 
of the resolution, and records of the discussions leading up to the resolution, especially 
statements made before or after the vote.
321
 As the ICJ pointed out in its Kosovo opinion, 
“[t]he interpretation of Security Council resolutions may require the Court to analyse 
statements by representatives of members of the Security Council made at the time of their 
adoption.”322  
However, in the case of most Security Council resolutions, such statements which 
could serve as useful means of interpretation will simply not be available. As explained in 
Section 1, the discussions leading up to a Security Council resolution mainly take place 
behind the scenes, in informal settings. Thus, large parts of the preparatory work are not on 
public record, so that the motivations of the Council members, and thus the reasons 
underpinning a given resolution, remain in the dark. The voting behaviour in the Security 
Council can only be assessed based on the hypothetical reasons that the rhetorical community 
assumes to be underlying it. As a consequence of this uncertainty, Council members, when 
confronted with criticism that their reasons are illegitimate, can simply argue that their votes 
were based on other than the alleged reasons. 
A duty to give reasons would not only render the Security Council and its members 
more accountable, but would, thereby, also increase the legitimacy of the Council and of its 
decisions. While there are different understandings of the concept of legitimacy in 
international law,
323
 a central aspect of most of them concerns the process of decision-
making, in particular with regard to qualities such as openness, transparency, representation, 
and participation.
324
 For Thomas Franck, for instance, the essence of legitimacy is “the 
perception of those addressed by a rule or a rule-making institution that the rule or institution 
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has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right 
process.”325 A duty to give reasons would enhance the transparency of the Security Council’s 
decision-making process. It would allow the participants of the rhetorical community in and 
around the Council to be clear about the reasons for a given vote in, or decision of, the 
Council, to debate them, and to either let themselves be convinced by them if they find them 
well-founded or contest them if they find them ill-founded. Enhancing the procedural 
legitimacy of the Council’s decision-making would, in turn, have a positive effect on 
compliance with its decisions. For, as has again been pointed out by Franck, the perception 
that a rule has come into being in accordance with the right process “exerts a pull toward 
compliance on those addressed normatively.”326 
This is not to argue that an increase in accountability through public reason-giving is 
necessarily beneficial in other international contexts than the Security Council. In mediation, 
for example, confidentiality serves to build an environment of trust where additional 
information can be disclosed and parties are more willing to disclose the reasons relating to 
their interests.
327
 Confidentiality also plays an important role in international diplomacy. For 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for example, secrecy even forms part 
of its identity.
328
 However, decision-making in the Security Council is not comparable to the 
settling of bilateral disputes as in cases of mediation or to the working methods of the ICRC. 
States involved in mediation have no wider responsibility towards the international 
community. Similarly, the ICRC sees itself as accountable to victims of armed conflict, not 
states or the wider public.
329
 It therefore understands confidential dialogue with states or 
armed groups to be the most effective means of protecting individuals in situations in which 
rational discourse has been abandoned.
330
 The Security Council and its members, in contrast, 
are accountable to the whole membership of the United Nations: they act as delegates of all 
other U.N. members and can thus be characterized as “trustees of the international 
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community”.331 Improving the accountability of Security Council decisions through a duty to 
give reasons is, therefore, a pressing concern. 
 
4.2 Proposal for a Duty to Give Reasons 
4.2.1 Introducing a Duty to Give Reasons 
The Security Council has been the subject of a multitude of reform attempts,
332
 many of 
which have aimed at changing the exercise of the veto by the Council’s permanent members. 
The first such reform efforts were undertaken as early as in 1949 when the General Assembly 
adopted a resolution that asked the permanent members to “exercise the veto only when they 
consider the question of vital importance.”333 This recommendation, however, remained 
unheeded. In more recent years, there have been proposals to limit the use of the veto in R2P 
situations,
334
 to establish a duty to explain the rationale for casting a veto,
335
 and to introduce 
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a procedure of ‘indicative voting’ in the Security Council.336 All of these reform efforts have 
focused on the exercise of the veto by the P5. None of them has, so far, led to any changes in 
the Council’s practice. 
As opposed to this, the proposal we present in what follows imposes a duty on each 
member of the Security Council to explain the reasons for its vote in a public meeting. All 
Council members would be obliged to explain all types of votes they cast, including votes that 
do not qualify as vetoes. Our proposal takes account of legitimate interests that may conflict 
with reason-giving and is designed with a view to practical implementation. Accordingly, it 
allows for some flexibility: it provides for a number of exceptions to the duty to give reasons, 
and the extent of explanation required may differ depending on the type of decision at hand. 
Our proposition aims to make the procedure of reason-giving as straightforward and efficient 
as possible. Many votes will not require lengthy statements. Also, if a Council member agrees 
with the explanation given by another member, it can simply join that explanation (or parts of 
it). Nevertheless, the general rule will be that Council members must give reasons for their 
votes.  
To be clear, our proposal does not require the Security Council to hold all meetings in 
public. It takes account of the Council’s nature as a quintessentially political organ that will 
often have to discuss delicate political matters in informal settings. For this reason, our 
proposal does not prevent the Council from holding informal consultations and private 
meetings. Instead, it simply requires its members to explain, in a public meeting, all votes 
they cast.   
There are three different ways of implementing a duty to give reasons as we conceive 
of it: first, by amending the U.N. Charter; second, by amending the PRoP; and third, by an 
informal change of practice.  
First, a duty of the Council members to give reasons could be introduced by amending 
the U.N. Charter. However, any such amendment would have to be ratified by all permanent 
members of the Council.
337
 Given the lack of success of previous reform attempts that aimed 
at changing the composition of the Security Council or the right to veto, the prospects for the 
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introduction of a duty to give reasons by way of an amendment of the U.N. Charter are 
dim.
338
 For this reason, we will not further consider this option. 
Second, a duty to give reasons could be implemented by way of amendment of the 
PRoP. As opposed to the U.N. Charter, the PRoP can be amended without the consent of the 
P5. While neither Article 30 of the U.N. Charter (the provision concerning the rules of 
procedure of the Council) nor the PRoP themselves stipulate special voting requirements for 
amending the Council’s rules of procedure, it is generally recognized that the requirement of 
Article 27(2) of the U.N. Charter is applicable.
339
 Pursuant to this provision, Security Council 
decisions “on procedural matters” are to be made “by an affirmative vote of nine members”. 
Accordingly, an amendment of the PRoP that would introduce a duty to give reasons for votes 
cast in the Council could not be prevented by the veto of a permanent member. In times of 
predominantly deadlocked Security Council reforms, changing its working methods by way 
of amendment of the PRoP thus constitutes a way out of the impasse.
340
  
One could object to this way of implementing the duty to give reasons that a 
permanent member, when confronted with a draft for an amendment of the PRoP, would 
make use of the so-called ‘double veto’.341 Thus, it could first raise what is called the 
preliminary question,
342
 which puts to a vote in the Council the question as to whether an 
issue (in our case: the amendment of the PRoP) constitutes a procedural or non-procedural 
matter. The permanent member could then use its veto a first time in the vote on the 
preliminary question, with the effect that the issue would have to be considered as a non-
procedural matter according to Article 27(3) of the U.N. Charter, triggering the veto privilege. 
In the ensuing vote, it could prevent adoption of the proposal by a second use of its veto.  
However, although a permanent member could not be prevented from using its double 
veto in such a manner, it is unlikely that it would do so as it would risk losing its face before 
the other Council members and the wider U.N. membership. For it is difficult to see how a 
reasonable argument could be made as to why an amendment of the PRoP should constitute a 
non-procedural matter in the sense of Article 27(3) rather than a procedural matter in the 
sense of Article 27(2) of the Charter. Neither the wording of the Charter nor that of the PRoP 
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leave any doubt that the introduction of a duty to give reasons in the PRoP would qualify as a 
procedural matter: the Council adopted its rules, entitled “Provisional Rules of Procedure”, 
based on Article 30 of the Charter, which stipulates that the Council “shall adopt its own rules 
of procedure”.343 Already the San Francisco Declaration of the four sponsoring governments 
of 1945 had made it clear that decisions made under Articles 28–32 of the Charter, which 
appear under the heading “Procedure”, constitute procedural matters within the meaning of 
Article 27(2) and that, therefore, “the Council will, by a vote of any seven of its members, 
adopt or alter its rules of procedure.”344 This position has been confirmed repeatedly since 
then.
345
 Finally, the fact that, due to an informal agreement in the Council, the double veto has 
not been used since 1959 makes it even more unlikely that a permanent member would resort 
to this procedure.
346
 
Third, a duty to give reasons could be implemented by way of an informal change of 
practice. Indeed, most of the recent changes in the Security Council’s working methods have 
been achieved not by amending the U.N. Charter or the PRoP but by introducing new 
practices through informal mutual agreements among Council members.
347
 Such mutually 
agreed changes may later be ‘formalized’ through Statements or Notes by the President of the 
Security Council or, more rarely, resolutions of the Council.
348
 
There are advantages and disadvantages to both the formal way of introducing a duty 
to give reasons by way of an amendment of the PRoP and the informal way through a change 
of practice. A formal amendment of the PRoP would be more transparent, and the Council 
members would most likely regard the duty as more binding. In contrast, an informal change 
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would allow the Council and its members to retain more flexibility, which increases the 
prospects for adoption. Although we do not favour one way of implementation over the other, 
we will—for the sake of illustration—put forth a concrete proposal for a formal amendment 
of the PRoP in order to demonstrate how a provision introducing a duty to give reasons for 
votes cast in the Security Council could be worded. In our opinion, Rule 48 of the PRoP, 
which opens Chapter IX entitled ”Publicity of Meetings, Records”, seems particularly well 
suited to accommodate a duty to give reasons. Our proposition can serve as a guideline, 
regardless of whether the duty to give reasons is endorsed formally or informally. Also in the 
latter case, that is, if the Council members agree on a change of practice rather than a formal 
amendment of the PRoP, our proposal can function as an inspiration as to the content of such 
an informal change.  
We suggest to add a new second paragraph to Rule 48, with the following wording: 
 
Rule 48 
Unless it decides otherwise, the Security Council shall meet in public. 
Each Member of the Security Council shall provide the reasons for its vote in the public meeting. A 
Member may upon request be relieved by the President from its duty to give reasons if it 
demonstrates that there is a risk that disclosure of the respective information would cause harm to 
legitimate privacy or security interests. The President shall grant the exemption provided that 
information is only withheld to the degree necessary to protect the respective interest and that the 
possible harm caused by disclosure of the relevant information to the protected interest outweighs 
the interest in disclosure. 
Any recommendation to the General Assembly regarding the appointment of the Secretary-General 
shall be discussed and decided at a private meeting. 
 
4.2.2 “Each Member of the Security Council …”  
A first issue that must be clarified is to whom exactly the duty to give reasons applies. Is it 
incumbent on each member of the Security Council or rather on the Council as a whole? As 
demonstrated in Section 4.1.2, there are a number of different rationales supporting the 
introduction of a duty to give reasons for the voting behaviour in the Security Council: 
reason-giving increases the quality of the adopted decisions, enhances legal certainty, and 
allows the Security Council and its members to be held accountable. Depending on the 
importance one attaches to these different rationales, the duty to give reasons will apply to 
different entities. For instance, if the accountability of the Security Council (or one of its 
66 
committees) as a collective body is given the greatest weight, then a statement of reasons 
issued by the Council (or the respective committee) itself might be the best means of allowing 
those affected by its decisions to challenge them. This explains, for example, why the 1267 
Committee has been obliged to publish a joint ‘narrative summary of reasons’ for listing 
individuals on the sanctions list.
349
 This narrative summary allows individuals to substantiate 
their requests for delisting by challenging a consolidated set of reasons that has led to their 
listing, rather than having to find these reasons in separate statements of the Committee’s 
members. On the other hand, if the quality of votes (and, thereby, of the decisions to which 
they contribute) is given more importance, then individual statements of reasons by each 
Council member are preferable, since states are more likely to adopt reasonable decisions if 
they have to persuade other actors of their respective reasons. Since the main concern of our 
proposal is to force Council members to engage in a rational discourse, we suggest—at least 
with regard to decisions of the Council itself (as opposed to those of its subsidiary bodies)—
the following solution: instead of a duty incumbent on the Council as a collective body, each 
Council member should be obliged to provide the reasons for its vote.  
For the same reason, unlike the better part of previous reform proposals,
350
 the duty to 
give reasons we propose is not restricted to the permanent members but extends to all 
members of the Security Council. The reason for this is simple: despite the fact that the veto 
privilege accords the P5 significant voting power, they are not the only members with the 
capacity to prevent a decision in the Council. Pursuant to Article 27(3) of the U.N. Charter, 
the vote of at least seven non-permanent members has the same effect as the veto of one 
permanent member. Therefore, it would be inconsistent to impose a duty to give reasons only 
on the P5. In order to set in motion the process of the civilizing force of hypocrisy and to 
ensure that individual Council members can be held accountable for their voting behaviour, it 
is necessary to oblige all members to give reasons for their votes.
351
 Even with regard to votes 
of non-permanent members that do not gather the necessary majority to prevent a decision of 
the Security Council, a duty to give reasons serves a useful purpose as it enables the rhetorical 
community to assess the reasons underlying these votes. 
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To draw an analogy, if the Security Council was to be compared to a court, our 
proposal could be said to follow the approach prevalent in common law systems (where, in 
general, every judge delivers her or his own opinion), rather than in civil law systems (where, 
in general, the court gives reasons for its judgment as a collective body). This ‘common law 
approach’ ensures that the individual members of the Council cannot hide behind the 
explanation given by the majority while still maintaining their self-interested justifications 
when voting. By requiring every member to explain its reasons independently, the discursive 
effects referred to in Section 4.1.2 can come into play for each member. In addition, our 
‘common law proposal’ is also more practicable than a joint statement of reasons by the 
Security Council as a whole. Our proposal does not require that the Council members agree 
on a certain justification for a decision. Also, it obviates the need for a secretary or a clerk in 
charge of drafting joint statements of reasons for decisions.  
For subsidiary bodies of the Security Council tasked with adopting measures that 
directly affect individuals, on the other hand, the ‘civil law model’ may be preferable. In these 
cases, the main concern is to provide for an effective accountability mechanism with regard to 
the decisions of the subsidiary body itself, an aim which may be better served through the 
provision of a joint statement of reasons. 
 
4.2.3 “… shall provide the reasons …” 
Another aspect of our proposals that must be spelled out is the extent of reasons that each 
member of the Security Council has to provide in a public meeting to explain its votes. We 
argue that the extent depends on the following variables: the type of decision at hand 
(procedural or non-procedural; executive, administrative, or legislative)
352
 and the type of 
Security Council member concerned (permanent or non-permanent).  
With regard to the type of decision at hand, the extent of the reasons that need to be 
given depends, first, on whether a procedural or non-procedural matter is voted on. In the 
case of matters that are clearly procedural, the requirements regarding reason-giving will in 
general be relaxed. In many cases, these matters are of such minor significance that an 
explanation will not be required at all. This is in line with the current practice of the Security 
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Council, which in cases of “procedural motions such as the adoption of the agenda, the 
extension of invitations, and the suspension or adjournment of a meeting”353 has even 
dispensed voting altogether. However, situations might arise in which also votes on 
procedural matters can be of greater significance. For example, the establishment of a new 
body or agency that assists the Security Council in fulfilling its functions, can—depending on 
the nature of this body—have rather far-reaching implications. In such a case, the extent of 
reasons provided will need to be more elaborate. 
Second, the extent of reasons depends on whether an executive, administrative, or 
legislative-type decision is at hand. As we have indicated above, the Security Council has 
considerably broadened its scope of activity over the last 25 years and has started to adopt—in 
addition to decisions that can be qualified as executive—an increasing number of decisions 
that are of a legislative or administrative nature.
354
 As a general rule, decisions that directly 
affect individuals, which are typically adopted by the Security Council’s subsidiary bodies,355 
need to be supported by detailed reasons.
356
 Explanations must be such as to enable the 
individual to identify and understand the reasons that have led to the decision. On the other 
hand, the requirements with regard to the degree of reasons are less strict if decisions only 
have an indirect impact on individuals, as is the case with general and abstract Security 
Council decisions.
357
 Thus, the more direct and important the impact on individuals is, the 
higher the requirements concerning the extent of reasons are. Whereas in some situations a 
single sentence might suffice in order to comply with the duty, a more elaborate justification 
is needed in others.  
In the case of executive-type decisions, that is, decisions within the scope of the 
traditional crisis management role of the Security Council, the Council possesses large 
discretion. This especially holds true for the determination according to Article 39 of the 
Charter concerning the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of 
aggression. In addition, since the Council needs to be able to take “prompt and effective 
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action”358 with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, there is 
normally no time for extensive deliberation.
359
 Accordingly, the requirements for the 
explanation of votes on such decisions are reduced. Yet also executive-type decisions demand 
a minimal extent of reasons to allow for their assessment by the rhetorical community. This is 
especially the case for resolutions adopted under Chapter VII that touch on matters of major 
political importance.  
As regards administrative-type decisions, that is, decisions that are aimed at and 
directly affect specific individuals, groups, or corporate entities, the duty to give reasons is 
particularly important as it is an indispensable prerequisite of accountability. Thus, we have 
argued in Section 3.1 above that, at least with regard to some of these decisions, international 
human rights law imposes already today, de lege lata, an obligation on the Security Council to 
give reasons and, respectively, on its members to explain their votes in the Council. As far as 
the Council has established international criminal tribunals for the prosecution of certain 
individuals, it has discharged this obligation by transposing it on these tribunals. In contrast, 
the Council has not imposed a corresponding duty to give reasons on its sanctions 
committees, even though they are authorized to impose measures such as travel bans, assets 
freezes, and arms embargoes on specific individuals and non-state entities. When the Council 
(or one of its subsidiary bodies) adopts decisions that directly affect important interests of 
non-state actors, they must be informed about the reasons for the decision or, in the case of 
the sanctions committees, about the basis for the listing. The explanations must be detailed 
enough to allow those affected to understand whether their arguments have been properly 
examined and, if necessary, to enable them to challenge the decision. 
Concerning legislative-type decisions, finally, a more nuanced view is necessary. The 
defining characteristic of legislative resolutions is that they impose obligations of a general 
and abstract nature, that is, obligations that are addressed to all states and that are not 
restricted to a particular situation.
360
 Accordingly, they do not normally affect individuals, at 
least not directly.
361
 In line with the general rule stated above, when voting on such decisions, 
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Council members would therefore not need to provide elaborate reasons. Nevertheless, there 
are important arguments in favour of providing robust reasons also for legislative-type 
decisions.
362
 Despite their general character, they often affect individuals indirectly, as is the 
case, for example, with the counter-terrorism measures that states are required to adopt under 
Resolution 1373. What is more, legislative acts of the Council typically have far-reaching 
consequences, not only because they are directed at all states but also because they are 
concerned with issues of major political importance.
363
 This is why it is crucial to get Council 
members to engage in an open exchange of rational arguments that can be assessed by the 
broader rhetorical community, not least to ensure the broad cooperation that implementation 
of legislative resolutions requires.
364
 As compared to executive-type decisions, legislative 
decisions will in general necessitate more detailed reasons because they directly concern all 
states and are more likely to indirectly affect individuals. Unlike administrative decisions, 
which must be supported by specific reasons allowing those who are directly affected to 
challenge them, however, it will suffice for Council members to provide general reasons 
corresponding to the general and abstract character of the obligations imposed by legislative 
decisions.
365
 
Furthermore, the extent of reasons required depends on the type of Security Council 
member that casts its vote. In particular, permanent members will in general face different 
requirements than non-permanent members. Although both non-permanent and permanent 
members can prevent decisions, only the latter have the power to veto a decision on their own. 
As we pointed out in Section 3.2 regarding the de lege lata duty to give reasons under the 
R2P, since the P5 are in a more powerful position, they must bear stricter obligations. Indeed, 
the very fact that these particular states were given the veto power in the U.N. Charter was 
justified with the greater responsibilities that are incumbent on them.
366
 For this reason, the P5 
                                                 
362
  See Hetmeier, supra note 357, p. 2863, para. 4. 
363
  See Talmon, supra note 9, pp. 186–187. 
364
  See Johnstone, supra note 9, p. 275. 
365
  See International Law Association, supra note 316, p. 13 (“With regard to decisions of a general nature, the 
reasons may relate to the general character of such a decision only.”) For the context of TFEU art. 296, para. 
2, see Robin John Feakins v. The Scottish Ministers, 19 June 2014, European Court of Justice, Opinion of 
Advocate General Kokott, Case C-335/13, 2014, para. 64 (“In the case of measures of general application, 
the statement of reasons may be confined to indicating the general situation which led to the adoption of the 
measure and the general objectives which it is intended to achieve.“) 
366
  Rudolf Geiger, ‘Article 23’ in Bruno Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 
(3
rd
 ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) p. 751, para. 10. 
71 
will in general have to provide more detailed reasons for their votes in the Security Council 
than non-permanent members. Nevertheless, in a situation in which adoption of a decision is 
prevented not by the P5, but seven or more non-permanent members, the latter will have to 
explain in more detail what their motivations for doing so are. 
 
4.2.4 “… for its vote …” 
We do not only propose that each member of the Security Council must provide reasons for 
its votes, but—again in contrast to other reform proposals—the duty suggested by us is also 
not limited to ‘no’ votes. The rationales for knowing the reasons behind a given vote apply 
equally to negative and affirmative votes. The reason for this is that not only a vote against a 
draft resolution of the Security Council can be considered illegal because, for example, it 
precludes the Council from preventing massive human rights violations. Also an affirmative 
vote of a member (or its abstention) can be incompatible with international law.
367
 Take, for 
example, a draft resolution that aims at establishing a sanctions regime that violates human 
rights. An affirmative vote on such a resolution by a Council member might be illegal. Yet the 
rhetorical community will only be able to assess the voting behaviour in such a scenario if the 
duty to give reasons extends to affirmative votes of Council members. Therefore, we propose 
a duty to give reasons for both negative and affirmative votes. 
 
4.2.5 “… harm to legitimate privacy or security interests …” 
In order for our proposal for a duty to give reasons to be a workable mechanism, it must not 
only be flexible with regard to the extent of reasons that may be required but also allow for 
certain exceptions that protect Council members from having to disclose sensitive 
information. We suggest that there are two kinds of interests that may justify non-disclosure: 
privacy interests and security interests. According to our proposal, reasons relating to these 
types of interests would not have to be disclosed in a public meeting as long as non-disclosure 
is necessary and balanced. These exceptions allow Council members to efficiently perform 
their responsibilities under the U.N. Charter, while still providing reasons for their votes as far 
as possible. 
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Firstly, members of the Council (or of one of its subsidiary bodies) do not have to (and 
indeed must not) disclose in a public meeting information if this would violate the privacy of 
any affected person. Such sensitive information includes, for example, bank accounts, 
addresses, or medical records of persons who are to be placed on a sanctions list.  
An exception from the duty to give reason must, secondly, apply where the relevant 
information is related to security interests and where there is a risk that disclosure would 
cause some degree of harm to these interests.
368
 A general invocation of security, however, is 
not sufficient. Instead, a specific and identifiable threat to security interests must be shown.
369
 
For example, strategic information with regard to the armament and location of military 
forces that is important to the success of an operation authorized by the Council would not 
have to be disclosed. This exception is supported by the fact that also under most domestic 
legal systems, security issues are regularly exempted from disclosure requirements.
370
 The 
Security Council, whose primary responsibility it is to maintain peace and security on the 
international level, should therefore a fortiori benefit from a respective exemption. 
 
4.2.6 “The President shall grant the exemption …” 
Exemptions based on legitimate privacy and security interests are only practicable if there is a 
body that can decide on giving or refusing them. We believe that the President of the Security 
Council is the most suitable body for exercising this task because it is the President who is 
entrusted by the PRoP with all formal tasks in the Security Council. Among these tasks are, 
for example, those of calling meetings (Rules 1–3), approving the agenda (Rule 7), presiding 
over the meetings (Rule 19), overseeing the conduct of business during meetings (Rules 27-
39), and deciding on the importance of corrections to meeting records (Rule 52). Because the 
presidency is held in turns and each President only holds office for one month, the risk of 
lopsided and biased exemptions is reduced.  
According to our proposal, Council members can submit an exemption request to the 
President before the relevant public Council meeting, setting out that there is a risk that the 
disclosure of specific information would cause harm to legitimate privacy or security 
interests. When receiving an exemption request, the President will have to undertake a two-
                                                 
368
  See Hovell, supra note 57, p. 106. This exception is also recognized by the ECJ: HTTS Hanseatic Trade 
Trust and Shipping GmbH v. Council, 7 December 2011, European Court of Justice, Case T-562/10, para. 33. 
369
  Hovell, supra note 57, p. 106. 
370
  Ibid., p. 97, 105. 
73 
stage assessment that bears analogy to the two-stage analysis that is applied for human rights 
limitations.
371
 At the first stage, the President needs to verify whether the requesting Council 
member indeed possesses a legitimate privacy or security interest with regard to the matter at 
hand. At the second stage, the President first has to analyse whether the Council member 
suggests withholding information to the degree necessary to protect the respective interest 
(that is, a least restrictive means test). The President has to make sure that only information 
relating to the sensible aspects of a matter will be withheld. Consider the example of Security 
Council Resolution 1973,
372
 which authorized U.N. member states to take all necessary 
measures to protect Libyan civilians and establish a no-fly zone in the Libyan airspace. With 
regard to this resolution, a Council member would have been justified in withholding 
information, disclosure of which could have jeopardized the security and the success of the 
military operation. Disclosure of such information could have resulted in a considerable 
degree of harm, especially to the rebels. There were other parts of the resolution, however, 
with regard to which the Council members probably could not have been exempted from 
providing reasons, including the parts regarding the arms embargo (paras 13-16), the ban on 
flights (paras 17-18), and the Panel of Experts (paras 24-29). After determining whether 
withholding certain information is necessary, the President then has to engage in balancing 
the relevant interests. In particular, the President has to decide whether the possible harm 
caused by disclosure outweighs the conflicting interest in disclosing the information. Only if 
withholding the information at issue is both necessary and balanced can (and indeed must) the 
President grant the exemption. 
In summary, our proposal for a duty to give reasons applies to each member of the 
Security Council and for all types of votes. An exemption from this duty is only possible upon 
request to the President of the Security Council. The President will grant the request if the 
Council member demonstrates that disclosure of the respective information would cause harm 
to legitimate privacy or security interests, that information is only withheld to the degree 
necessary to protect that interest, and that the possible harm caused by disclosure outweighs 
the interest in disclosure. 
 
Conclusion 
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On 27 March 2013, on the occasion of the inauguration of the newly renovated Consultations 
Room—the chamber adjacent to the Security Council Chamber built in 1978 for holding 
informal consultations—the representative of the Russian Federation (and then Security 
Council President) remarked:  
“This is the place where most important decisions affecting international peace and security are hashed 
out. This is the place where most heated debates occur. This is the place where the diplomats who have 
the privilege to work in the Security Council spend the most interesting hours and days of their 
professional lives. This is, quite simply, the most fascinating place in the entire diplomatic universe.”373 
That the most heated debates on issues affecting international peace and security 
would be held in secret outside the Security Council’s actual meeting place is not what states 
had in mind when they drafted the U.N. Charter and the PRoP. They expected these debates to 
take place in the formal, public meetings of the Council, not behind closed doors. They 
thought that these meetings would serve as a forum in which the members of the Council 
would explain their respective positions.
374
 However, due to the shift of decision-making from 
the Security Council Chamber to the Consultations Room, from public to informal meetings, 
the public meetings have been deprived of their original function. As the public meetings have 
been reduced to mere pro forma affairs, it has become difficult for the rhetorical community 
in and around the Security Council to understand the motives behind a given resolution. 
Seen from this perspective, our proposal for a duty to give reasons for votes cast in the 
Security Council is by no means revolutionary: all it aims to achieve is to restore the function 
of the public meetings as it was originally conceived and to force the explanation of positions 
back into the public sphere. Council members would still be permitted to negotiate in informal 
settings, but they would have to explain the reasons for their votes in a public meeting. This 
would improve legal certainty regarding the Council’s decisions and enhance the 
accountability (and thus also legitimacy) of the Council and its members. Most crucially, 
however, it would lead to qualitatively better decisions. The substance of a debate is shaped to 
                                                 
373
  Inauguration of the Russian Room (Security Council Consultations Room), Remarks by H.E. Mr. Vitaly I. 
Churkin, 27 March 2013, <webtv.un.org/search/inauguration-of-the-russian-room-security-council-
consultations-room/2258040243001?term=consultationsandlanguages=Englishandsort=date>, 7 July 2016, 
(at 02:30 minutes). 
374
  See Section 1.1 (demonstrating that in the early years of the U.N., public meetings were the rule). That public 
meetings were originally conceived as the primary locus for Council debates also becomes evident when 
considering PRoP rule 48. The wording of this rule, adopted in 1946, makes it clear that, apart from rare 
exceptions, the Council was supposed to meet in public; see also Reid, supra note 27. 
75 
a very considerable degree by its public or secret nature. States are acutely aware of this fact. 
When, for example, the Security Council was to hold a special session on the Ukraine crisis, a 
dispute arose among its members as to the format of the session. While Russia wanted an 
informal consultation behind closed doors, the other Council members insisted on a public 
meeting.
375
 States would be more reluctant to block Security Council action designed to 
prevent serious violations of international law if they were forced to explain in public their 
reasons for doing so.  
Requiring the members of the Security Council to give reasons for their voting 
behaviour accords with the very structure of the international legal system. The Council 
members act as trustees of the international community. The international community must 
know what positions they stand for. 
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